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THE PRIORITIES OF MEXICO'S FOREIGN POLICY AT THE BEGINNING OF 21 CENTURY: OVERVIEW OF AMLO ADMINISTRATION

Tetiana Bohdanova*

Iryna Tykhonenko**

Abstract

The article attempts to analyze the priorities of Mexico's foreign policy at the beginning of the XXI century with an emphasis on reviewing the foreign policy strategy of the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). The methodological basis of the study is a comparative analysis of Mexico's foreign policy priorities.

Currently, Mexico is the leading state in Latin America, which tries to implement an autonomous foreign policy, being involved in all international affairs. In the XXI century Mexico moved away from the policy of isolationism in accordance with the Estrada doctrine and began to be guided by the Castañeda doctrine – to conduct an active foreign policy both at the regional and global levels of the international system. Therefore, the following goals of Mexico's foreign policy strategy can be defined: support of regional autonomy and a balanced policy in the international arena, issues of social and economic development of the state, relations with the U.S.

Despite the ambitious goals of Mexican foreign policy, the state has a number of internal problems that undoubtedly affect its positioning in the world. It is worth noting that the administration of the previous President Peña Nieta emphasized the positioning of Mexico as an active player in the international arena. In turn, the López Obrador administration, being populist, puts domestic politics as the primary goal of its activities – following the principle “the best foreign policy is a good domestic policy”. Therefore, Mexican priorities under the AMLO administration are the development of trade and economic cooperation with Central American states, relations with

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the United States (in particular, within the framework of the USMCA and the reduction of migration flows), as well as non-interference in global issues of international politics. It should be noted that such non-interference is quite controversial on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian war – neutrality in condemning Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the existing pro-Russian position of the leading political elites.

Keywords: Andres Manuel López Obrador, AMLO administration, Mexico, Mexico-U.S. relations, Castañeda doctrine

ПРІОРИТЕТИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ МЕКСИКИ НА ПОЧАТКУ XXI СТОЛІТТЯ: ОГЛЯД АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ ЛОПЕСА ОБРАДОРА (AMLO)

Тетяна Богданова*

Ірина Тихоненко**

Анотація

У статті здійснено спробу аналізу пріоритетів зовнішньої політики Мексики на початку XXI ст. з акцентом на огляді зовнішньополітичної стратегії адміністрації Президента Андреса Мануеля Лопеса Обрадора (AMLO). Методологічною основою дослідження виступає компаративний аналіз пріоритетів зовнішньої політики Мексики у XXI ст.

Наразі Мексика є провідної державою у Латинській Америці, яка намагається реалізовувати автономну зовнішню політику, будучи залученою до усіх міжнародних справ. У XXI ст. Мексика відійшла від політики ізоляціонізму відповідно до доктрини Естради та почала керуватися доктриною Кастаньєди – вести активну зовнішню політику як на регіональному, так і глобальному рівнях міжнародної системи. Тому, характерними цілями зовнішньополітичної стратегії Мексики можна визначити наступні: підтримка регіональної автономії та збалансована політика на міжнародній арені, питання соціального та економічного розвитку держави, відносини зі США.

Незважаючи на амбітні цілі мексиканської зовнішньої політики, держава має низку внутрішніх проблем, що безперечно впливають на її позиціонування у світі. Варто зазначити, що адміністрація попереднього Президента Пенья Ньето робила акцент на позиціонуванні Мексики як активного гравця на міжнародній арені. У свою чергу, адміністрація Лопеса Обрадора, будучи популістською, ставить внутрішню політику як першочергову ціль своєї діяльності – дотримуючись принципу «найкраща зовнішня політика – це хороша внутрішня політика». Тому, мексиканські пріоритети за адміністрації AMLO є розвиток торговельно-економічної співпраці з державами Центральної Америки, відносини зі США (зокрема, в межах ЮСМКА та зменшення міграційних потоків), а також невтручання у глобальні питання міжнародної політики. Відзначимо, що політика невтручання є досить

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контроверсійним на прикладі російсько-української війни – нейтральність щодо засудження агресії Росії та наявна проросійська позиція у провідних політичних елітах.

Ключові слова: Андрес Мануель Лопес, адміністрація AMLO, Мексика, мексикансько-американські відносини, доктрина Кастаньєди

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URL: <https://konsensus.net.ua/index.php/konsensus/article/view/70>

Research Issue and Its Significance. The 21 century was marked by the growth of the global role of Latin America. The leading states of the region – Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – are members of the G20, and the election of an Argentinian as Pope Francis I in 2013 became also symbolic for the importance of Latin America on the global stage. Mexico is the second country (after Brazil) in terms of population and GDP in the region¹, one of the leading producers and exporters oil in the region.

Mexico for a long time (from the 1930s to the 2000s) was guided by Estrada's isolationist foreign policy doctrine, which means a policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, in particular neighboring authoritarian regimes, and refusal to positively or negatively evaluate their leaders². At the beginning of the 21 century, under the administration of Vincente Fox, the rethinking of the regional position and vectors of foreign policy was made, and as a result, the transition to the Castañeda doctrine was implemented. During the administration of Felipe Calderon, Mexico became one of the initiators of the consolidation of Latin America as one of the poles of the world's global architecture, contributing to the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). However, later diplomatic work in this direction weakened somewhat under the influence of the domestic agenda.

Currently, the Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) administration is demonstrating Mexico's return to the doctrine of non-intervention with an emphasis on domestic politics. It becomes important to identify the accents and positions of the AMLO administration regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and relations with the United States, which continue to be central to Mexican foreign policy. It is important to stress on the factor of upcoming presidential election in Mexico in 2024, given the constitutional limits on the double term of office of the president.

Analysis of the Latest Research and Publications. Mexico belongs to the Latin American civilization, while for almost two centuries it has close ties with the U.S., since 1994 it has been a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now

¹ Explore All Countries Mexico. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. URL: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/mexico/#economy>

² Groen C. To the Left, To the Left: Mexico's turn to an Old Foreign Policy Doctrine. *Berkeley Political Review*. 2020. May 1. URL: <https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2020/05/01/to-the-left-to-the-left-mexicos-return-to-an-old-foreign-policy-doctrine/>

USMCA. Ukrainian researchers consider Mexico's foreign policy mainly through the context of U.S.-Mexican relations (I. Derevianko³) or Mexico's participation in integration processes in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean (L. Matlai⁴). Certain aspects of Mexico's foreign policy, in particular, participation in NAFTA/USMCA, are highlighted in the works of M. Bessonova, T. Bohdanova, and N. Kryvenko⁵. The problems of creating the Pacific Alliance are reflected in the article by I. Plevako and V. Stepanets⁶.

Analysis of recent research and publications has demonstrated the presence of a significant volume of scientific works devoted to the contemporary foreign policy of Mexico. However, the data of the study mainly concern the traditional vectors of Mexico's foreign policy. Among them, note the works of S. Villanueva⁷, E. Sandoval⁸, R. Velazquez Flores and R. Dominguez⁹. The researchers of Mexican scientists and politicians, namely, J. Castañeda and H. Camín¹⁰ stressed on the basic principles of Mexico's foreign policy.

Statements of the presidents of Mexico, annual reports of heads of state on the main issues of domestic and foreign policy created the source base of the research.

The purpose of the study is to clarify the priorities of Mexico's foreign policy at the beginning of 21 century and overview their transformation under the administration of A.M. López Obrador (since 2018).

At the crossroads of international and domestic politics, Mexico's foreign policy has gained the status of one of the main strategic components of government action. In addition to solving routine issues, officials are tasked with paving the way to medium- and

³ Дерев'яно І. Ефекти асиметрії в американо-мексиканських відносинах. *Вісник Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка. Міжнародні відносини*. 2019. Вип. 2. С. 43–48. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/VKNU_mv_2019_2_10

⁴ Матлай Л.С. Мексика у міжнародній інтеграції: політико-економічний аспект. *Вісник Дніпропетровського університету. Серія: Філософія. Соціологія. Політологія*. 2015. № 4. С. 62–68. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/vdusfp_2015_4_11

⁵ Бессонова М.М. Канадсько-мексиканська співпраця в рамках НАФТА. *Історико-політичні студії. Збірник наукових праць. Серія «Політичні науки»*. 2018. № 2 (10). С. 5–15; Богданова Т. Є. ЮСМКА як новий етап північноамериканської інтеграції. *Наукові праці. Політологія*. 2019. Вип. 312. Т. 324. С. 33–37; Кривенко Н. Торговельно-економічне співробітництво США, Канади і Мексики в контексті угод НАФТА та ЮСМКА. *Журнал європейської економіки*. 2020. Т. 19. № 4. С. 611–643.

⁶ Плевако І., Степанець П. Тихоокеанський Альянс – новий міжрегіональний геополітичний проект. *Наукові записки Національного університету «Острозька академія». Серія: Міжнародні відносини*. 2013. Вип. 3. С. 253–268.

⁷ Villanueva C. Mexican Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: From Defensive Tradition to Incomplete Modernity. *Politics and Policy*. 2019. Vol. 47. Issue 1. P. 28–49.

⁸ Sandoval E.R. Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México en las Américas: apuntes para la “cuarta transformación”. *Fundación Carolina*, 2019. URL: <https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/AC-12.pdf>

⁹ Velázquez Flores R., Domínguez R. Balance de la política exterior de México en el sexenio de Felipe Calderón bajo los tres niveles de análisis: límites y alcances. *Foro Internacional*. 2013. № 53 (3–4). P. 483–516.

¹⁰ Castañeda J.G., Camín H.A. Un future para Mexico. Mexico, D.F.: Santillana Ed.Generales, 2010. 111 s.; Castañeda J.G., Camín H.A. Mexico's Age of Agreement. *Foreign Affairs*. 2012. URL: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138361/hector-aguilar-camin-and-jorge-gcastaneda/mexicos-age-of-agreement

long-term foreign policy goals. Naturally, the goals are aimed at protecting national interests, such as economic prosperity or national security, but they also reflect Mexico's image, how it understands its role in the international system, and what its core values are¹¹. Thus, foreign policy is usually determined by both a combination of structural conditions and national capabilities, as well as a set of multiple, intersecting identities and values. Structural conditions such as geographic location, availability of natural resources, long-term economic development, and political system are understood as characteristics that cannot be changed easily or cannot be changed at all. National capabilities are related to a country's economic power, military assets, global presence and activity. As part of the international community, states also promote certain values or worldviews according to their cultural or political identity, which are useful for promoting their national interests and strengthening alliances with other global actors.

However, the international system imposes its own limitations on the design of foreign policy. Unprecedented global challenges of the modern world create inextricable ties between the state and non-state actors. Isolated actions hardly ever produce results. Dialogue and cooperation are prerequisites for a harmonious global community that is ready to take on the challenges of tomorrow.

In this regard, Mexico is an interesting example of policy formation and implementation precisely because of its unique combination of multiple identities, structural conditions, opportunities, and values. The country has a privileged geopolitical location, access to the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, sufficient natural and human resources, and a population of more than 120 million people with a significant demographic bonus¹².

Three main topics characterize the foreign policy concepts of Mexico at the turn of the 20-21 centuries. Firstly, the need to strengthen national and regional autonomy is given special importance, focusing more on the concept of a balanced distribution of functions in the international arena, and not on the desire to gain significant advantages in the struggle for power. Secondly, the importance of promoting and achieving economic and social development. And, thirdly, the primary and predominant role of bilateral relations with the United States¹³.

The transformation of Mexican foreign policy in recent years is determined by internal and external factors¹⁴. Nowadays global challenges are numerous and complex. They are the result of a process of transformation that the world has undergone and which

¹¹ The road ahead: the 21st-Century world order in the eyes of policy planners / B. Belli, F. Nasser (Eds.). Brasília: FUNAG, 2018. P. 250-251.

¹² Ibid. P. 251.

¹³ Kosevich E. Mexico in the system of geopolitical coordinates of the beginning of the 21st century. Moscow; Saint Petersburg: Nestor-Historia, 2020. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345716955_Mexico_in_the_system_of_geopolitical_coordinates_of_the_beginning_of_the_21st_century

¹⁴ Bohdanova T. Mexico's foreign policy: objectives and challenges. *Міжнародні відносини і безпека в багатопольному світі: контури нового світоустрою для України та світу: матеріали наукової конференції* (червень 2023 р.). Суми, 2023 (у друці).

has greatly accelerated in recent decades, paying particular attention to issues such as globalization, rapid technological change, the emergence of new security threats, worsening climate change, unprecedented flows of migrants and refugees, and a new phase of geopolitics. In an interconnected and interdependent world, these problems must be solved collectively and comprehensively. From a Mexican perspective, should be analyzed some of the biggest challenges the world is currently facing and in which Mexico will continue to play a leading role¹⁵.

Mexico develops and conducts its foreign policy within the framework of its constitutional principles. These principles are also based on the fact that Mexico is an actor with global responsibility, and the conduct of an active and consistent foreign policy is key to its internal development, the affirmation of national sovereignty and the strengthening of the country.

Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929–2000, to a true multiparty democracy. Two presidents from the conservative National Action Party (PAN) – Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) – struggled to enact some of the reforms designed to address Mexico's economic and security challenges.

The PRI's return to the presidency in 2012 created new expectations for foreign policy. From the start, Peña Nieto administration marked a significant difference in foreign policy objects by not putting security, migration and human rights on the agenda, unlike previous governments, but it also sought to put a different spin on his foreign policy. The plan was to make Mexico a responsible global player.

According to Rafael Velazquez Flores and Jessica de Alba Ulloa, the activity of this administration was deeply conditioned by internal and external factors in different stages of the term. The authors identify the main foreign policy goals of the Peña administration.

The new government planned to gain more weight for the country in international relations system from a position more committed to global issues. It seemed that the goal was to achieve a greater correspondence between the geographical and economic importance of the state with the scope of its foreign policy. To achieve this goal, the president proposed four pillars: strengthening Mexico's international presence; expand international cooperation; promote Mexico's value in the world and monitor Mexico's interests abroad Another major goal was to improve the country's image abroad. The general perception and image of the country outside to 2012 was violence due to the number of deaths resulting from the drug trade. For this, the new government has developed various strategies. The media was asked not to focus on news of violence in Mexico, and all Mexican missions abroad were instructed to promote a positive image of the country. This policy became a priority at the beginning of Peña Nieto's administration¹⁶.

¹⁵ The road ahead: the 21st Century world order in the eyes of policy planners... P. 256–257.

¹⁶ Velázquez Flores R., Alba Ulloa J.L. de. Los Factores Internos y Externos en la Política Exterior Mexicana (2012–2018): Una Evaluación General. *Foro Internacional*. 2019, № 3–4 (237–238). P. 675–676.

Four pillars of the National Development Plan for 2013–2018 were established by Government of Mexico in the following foreign policy goals:

- 1) promote political dialogue to strengthen Mexico's presence in the world and provide a clear and reliable legal framework for interaction with other states;
- 2) promote the value of Mexico through economic, tourism and cultural outreach;
- 3) affirm free trade, capital mobility and industrial integration;
- 4) watch over the interests of Mexicans abroad and protect the rights of foreigners in the national territory¹⁷.

According to scientists, Mexican foreign policy during the period of Peña Nieto developed in 4 stages: 1) from 2012 to 2014, which develops the structural reforms that impacted Mexico's foreign policy; 2) from 2014 to 2016 that analyzes domestic issues; 3) from 2016 to mid-2018 when Donald Trump appeared on the political scene; 4) and from mid-2018 until the end of the administration¹⁸.

Since Donald Trump became the head of the U.S., the foreign policy position of Peña Nieto's government has been adjusted. On January 23, 2017, President Enrique Peña Nieto outlined Mexico's foreign policy position. He said that "Mexico must not only face the new world challenges that are emerging, but also take advantage of the new opportunities that are arising with them". He focused Mexico's foreign policy will be oriented towards two main priorities:

- 1) Strengthening Mexico's presence in the world, in order to diversify its political, trade, investment, tourism and cooperation links.
- 2) Building a new map of dialogue and negotiation in bilateral relations with the United States¹⁹.

Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took office for a six-year term in December 2018. President López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative chambers. As of May 2023, MORENA controlled 201 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 of 128 seats in the Mexican Senate²⁰.

In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has represented Mexico in global fora. After 2018 Presidential elections AMLO (Andrés Manuel López Obrador) administration announced it

¹⁷ Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013–2018. *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*. URL: <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mex148347.pdf>

¹⁸ Velázquez Flores R., Alba Ulloa J.L. de. Los Factores Internos y Externos en la Política Exterior... P. 671.

¹⁹ Mexican Foreign Policy Objectives. *Gobierno de Mexico*. 2017. January 23. URL: <https://www.gob.mx/epn/en/articulos/mexican-foreign-policy-objectives>

²⁰ Ribando Seelke C. Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations. *Congressional Research Service*. 2023. May 17. P. 3. URL: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42917.pdf>

would focus on the south, protect Mexicans abroad, work for transparent diplomacy and strengthen Mexico's role in human rights and the multilateral agenda²¹.

The assessment of López Obrador's personality by G. Weeks represent interesting facts. President López Obrador is a populist for whom foreign policy issues are not relevant. In his 2018 election campaign, he proposed ambitious plans to address the problems of corruption, poverty and human rights violations, and tried to avoid foreign policy issues and conflicts that divert attention from the domestic political agenda. After his election as a Mexican President, his approval rating was 86%, which encouraged him to continue to follow the principle of "the best foreign policy is a good domestic policy", which consists in carrying out reforms, increasing trade and economic cooperation with the countries of Central America and ignoring other issues of international politics²².

Rafael Velazquez determines three key characteristics of AMLO's foreign policy in 2018–2020. Firstly, a pattern of change and continuity. His administration has maintained some international policies implemented by past governments and, at the same time, it has transformed others. Secondly, the new administration has adopted a pragmatic approach and, at the same time, has developed a foreign policy based on Mexico's traditional tenets, such as non-intervention, self-determination, peaceful dispute resolution and so on. Thirdly, the first year of the AMLO administration has seen a pattern of conflict and cooperation, particularly with the United States²³.

As President, López Obrador continued to show limited interest in international affairs, mostly focusing on cooperation with the US on the North American Free Trade Area and helping to reduce migration flows from Central America to the US in exchange for non-interference in Mexico's internal affairs²⁴.

In Latin American region, the present leadership of Mexico changed its stance on Juan Guaidó's recognition as the Interim President of Venezuela. Instead, they facilitated negotiations under the guidance of Norway in 2021, involving representatives from both Nicolás Maduro administration and the political opposition. The government led by López Obrador also worked on strengthening its ties with Cuba, offering temporary asylum to Evo Morales, who was removed from his position as the President of Bolivia. Also Mexico refrained from endorsing Organization of American States' resolutions that criticized

²¹ The Foreign Policy of the Mexican Government Is Transparent, Humanitarian and Effective. *Gobierno de Mexico*. 2019. URL: <https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/the-foreign-policy-of-the-mexican-government-is-transparent-humanitarian-and-effective>

²² Weeks G. AMLO's cautious foreign policy. *Global Americans*. 2020. July 24. URL: <https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/02/amlos-cautious-foreign-policy/>

²³ Velazquez R. Mexico's New Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatism and Principism. *Latin America and the New Global Order. Dangers and Opportunities in a Multipolar World. Institute for International Political Studies*. 2020. P. 125. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340362827_6_Mexico's_New_Foreign_Policy_Between_Pragmatism_and_Principism

²⁴ Rudman A. Mexico's domestic-minded foreign policy could alienate the US. *The Hill*. 2021. URL: <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/567407-mexicos-domestic-minded-foreign-policy-could-alienate-the-us/>

Daniel Ortega government in Nicaragua, and showed support for Pedro Castillo, the impeached President of Peru.

Thus, U.S.-Mexico relations have grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S. immigration and border security policies, negotiated a U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA), worked with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework. Nevertheless, ongoing insecurity in Mexico and illicit drug trafficking from Mexico, trade disputes, and U.S. concerns over democracy and human rights issues have caused tension. The Mexican government has pressed for increased U.S. efforts to address drug demand and gun trafficking.

Mexico's long-standing war on drugs, with the support of Washington, has neither slowed the flow of illicit substances into the U.S., nor reduced violence in Mexico. AMLO took office with plans to address the root causes of drug use and violence, using military to tackle drug-related crime and violence²⁵.

Mexico's relations with the United States under Trump administration figured prominently among AMLO's challenges. Some expected that relations between ANLO and Biden administration would have some more differences, but two leaders have steered clear of any major disputes, while cooperating on continuing to migrants' access to the southern U.S. border.

Specialists in Latin American Affairs by U.S. Congressional Research Service resumed U.S.-Mexico relations are likely to be tested in 2023 by ongoing tension in security and energy relations and by U.S. concerns over human rights, the weakening of Mexico's democratic institutions, and the military's growing role in Mexico's economy and society.

According to Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs of U.S. Congress, Andrés Manuel López Obrador has remained popular (63% approval rating in February 2023), likely because of his social programs, minimum wage increases, and ability to connect with voters. Critics have expressed concerns about López Obrador's attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform civilian functions. According to the International Monetary Fund, Mexico's economy expanded 3.1% in 2022 and may expand 1.8% in 2023. Observers expect MORENA to dominate the July 2024 presidential elections even though President López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection²⁶.

R. Sandoval stressed that Mexico currently has such style of foreign policy, where the president makes unbalanced and uncoordinated populist statements due to a lack of interest and understanding of international issues, and then the minister of foreign affairs,

²⁵ Can AMLO Deliver on His Vision for Mexico's Future. *World Politics Review*. 2023. June 12. URL: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/under-amlo-mexico-s-economy-and-mexico-u-s-relations-in-the-spotlight>

²⁶ Ribando Seelke C. Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations... P. 2.

who has a much better understanding of the details of international politics, tries to “put out fires” and clarifies the president’s positions and statements²⁷.

Mexico’s current position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war can be characterized as neutrality bordering on aiding the aggressor.

Although Mexico was the first among Latin American countries in 2014²⁸ to issue an official statement regarding support for the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine (the administration of E. Peña Nieto), it also consistently supported all Ukrainian resolutions from the UN General Assembly both in 2014 and in 2022 year, Mexico refused to support the sanctions policy of the states of the Western world. The leader of Mexico did not express solidarity with the Ukrainian people and did not express proposals for asylum for Ukrainian refugees. President President López Obrador pointed out that Russia’s war against Ukraine is the result of the mistakes of the world’s political elites, who “couldn’t create conditions for maintaining peace”. In addition, Mexico refused to supply weapons to Ukraine, but expressed its intention to provide humanitarian aid²⁹.

Note that neutrality is the main traditional position of Mexico regarding international affairs, and it is also constitutionally enshrined. Official Mexico City historically follows the concept of “principled pragmatism” in politics, if in some cases the primacy of international law is preserved, and in others – national interests are a priority³⁰.

Mostly Mexican neutrality is manifested in President López Obrador’s rather naive proposal to declare a five-year global truce. For this, as the Mexican president stated, it is necessary to form a committee of 3 people with the participation of UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, Pope Francis and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. According to López Obrador, Narendra Modi, who maintains good relations with the leaders of Russia, the United States, and China, will be able to convince all three parties to agree to the proposed peace initiative.

First of all, Antonio Guterres, Pope Francis and Narendra Modi must achieve an end to the war in Ukraine and at the same time convince Russia, China and the USA, as the main “disturbers of peace in the world”, to sign a five-year peace treaty. The formed committee should also deal with the solution of the “Taiwan” issue, as well as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict³¹.

It is appropriate to point out that Mexico has clearly separated itself from the rest of the countries of Latin America by abstaining from voting in the UN General Assembly regarding the issue of Russia’s exclusion from the Human Rights Committee in accordance

²⁷ Sandoval E.R. Schizophrenia in Mexican Foreign Policy: Lopez Obrador’s Government Facing the War in Ukraine. *Wilson Center*. 2022. URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/schizophrenia-mexican-foreign-policy-lopezobradors-government-facing-war-ukraine>

²⁸ Політичні відносини між Україною та Мексикою. *Посольство України в Мексиканських Сполучених Штатах: офіційний сайт*. 2019. 25 серпня. URL: <https://mexico.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo/477-politichni-vidnosini-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-meksikoj>

²⁹ Can AMLO Deliver on His Vision for Mexico’s Future...

³⁰ Velazquez R. Mexico’s New Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatism and Principism... P. 125.

³¹ Can AMLO Deliver on His Vision for Mexico’s Future...

with the violation of international law and the creation of a de facto genocide of the Ukrainian people. In addition, Mexico did not join the group of 41 states that appealed to the International Criminal Court with a request to conduct an official investigation into the crimes committed by the Russian army in Ukraine. Also, among Mexican political elites, the vast majority is dominated by a pro-Russian position. Almost a month after the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion, about half a dozen members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Mexican parliament), among them the ruling MORENA party, as well as the Workers' Party and the opposition Institutional Revolutionary Party, created the "Mexican-Russian Friendship Committee" of the General Congress of the United Mexican States of the states.

Note that the speech of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi on April 20, 2023, in a video conference mode before the members of the Congress of the United Mexican States and diplomatic representatives, could not fundamentally change the attitude of the political elite of Mexico regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. Of course, at the diplomatic level, Mexico condemns Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the discourse of most political elites is dominated by the view of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a conflict in which there is no clear culprit and which can be resolved through concessions and dialogue. Mexico is not ready to join the policy of international isolation of the Russian Federation, as it considers Russia its partner and sees prospects in cooperation with it, as opposed to the USA. In general, Mexico condemns the war as such, calls for peace and dialogue, but at the same time, leaves room for establishing cooperation with Russia in the future, because it does not support the international sanctions policy and does not provide military support to Ukraine³².

In particular, President López Obrador, in his comments on the summit in Saudi Arabia on August 5 and 6, 2023, regarding the implementation of the Ukrainian peace formula, noted that Mexico will participate in the negotiations regarding Ukraine, only if both sides are present, but called the war "irrational"³³.

Foreign policy of Mexico in the 21 century has changed regarding the activation of Mexico's position in the international arena in accordance with the Castañeda doctrine. In sum, Mexico's foreign policy under AMLO administration can be characterized by several aspects:

- 1) under López Obrador, Mexico has returned to its historic noninterventionist and independent approach to foreign policy;
- 2) U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation may falter as both countries convene presidential elections in 2024;
- 3) Mexico has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and proposed the creation of a high-level caucus for peace in Ukraine within the United Nations.

³² Шевченко Н. Президент Зеленський виступив у Конгресі Мексики: як відреагував мексиканський політикум та медіа? *Українська призма*. 2023. 1 травня. URL: http://prismua.org/lach_digest5/

³³ Президент Мексики закликає припинити "ірраціональну" війну в Україні. iPress. 2023. 31 липня. URL: https://ipress.ua/news/prezydent_meksyky_zaklykaie_prypynyty_irratsionalnu_vynnu_v_ukraini_346121.html

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ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMY IN CONDITION OF POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL LIMITS

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Abstract

The history of mankind from a material point of view is a change in technological systems, which determined the forms of organization of economic life. History has recorded many phase crises associated with the transition from one technological mode to another. The key objectives of the EU environmental policy are: combating climate change, ensuring biodiversity, limiting the negative impact of production on human health and quality of life, rational use of natural resources, waste recycling. Environmental policy is a joint competence of the Member States and the EU bodies. The goals of the EU's common agricultural policy are: increasing agricultural productivity, ensuring social protection of farmers, stabilizing agricultural markets, food security, maintaining reasonable consumer prices for agricultural goods, and providing export subsidies. EU countries' strategies for the energy sector are different. France remains a supporter of nuclear energy. Germany is closing down nuclear power plants, necessitating an increase in energy production from thermal power plants and alternative energy sources. Achieving new environmental standards in industry raises questions of socio-political stability, as there is a risk of job losses in the old industrial sectors and the slow creation of new jobs. Such disparities can negatively affect the political support of "green" environmental political parties, especially in the countries of "old" Europe. The political positions of the "greens" in the countries of the "new" Europe are less influential. This fact complicates the formation of a joint environmental group of influence in the EU in order to exert political pressure to implement environmental modernization of the economy. That is, the success of the ecological modernization of the EU economy systematically depends on the internal capacity of elites and European societies to implement this course and on the favorable balance of power in a globalized world.

Keywords: European integration, the European Union, environmental policy, phase transition crisis, Green Party

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**ЕКОЛОГІЧНА МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЯ ЕКОНОМІКИ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ
ЗА УМОВ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ І ФІНАНСОВИХ ОБМЕЖЕНЬ**

Ігор Горобець*
Андрій Мартинов**

Анотація

У статті зазначається, що історія людства з матеріальної точки зору є зміною технологічних укладів, які визначали форми організації економічного життя. Історія зафіксувала чимало фазових криз, пов'язаних із переходами від одного технологічного укладу до іншого. Ключовими завданнями екологічної політики ЄС визначено: боротьбу зі змінами клімату, забезпечення біологічної різноманітності, обмеження негативного впливу виробництва на здоров'я людей та якість життя, раціональне використання природних ресурсів, переробка відходів. Екологічна політика перебуває у сфері спільної компетенції держав-членів та органів ЄС. Цілями спільної аграрної політики ЄС є: підвищення продуктивності сільського господарства, забезпечення соціального захисту аграріїв, стабілізація ринків аграрної продукції, продовольча безпека, підтримка розумних споживацьких цін на сільськогосподарські товари, надання експортних субсидій. Різними є стратегії країн ЄС щодо енергетичного сектору. Франція залишається прихильницею атомної енергетики. Німеччина закриває атомні станції, що обумовлює потребу збільшення виробництва енергії на теплових станціях та із альтернативних джерел електроенергії.

Досягнення нових екологічних стандартів у промисловості ставить питання соціально-політичної стабільності, адже існує ризик скорочення кількості робочих місць у старих промислових секторах та повільне створення нових. Такі диспропорції можуть негативно позначитись на політичній підтримці «зелених» екологічних політичних партій насамперед у країнах «старої» Європи. Політичні позиції «зелених» у країнах «нової» Європи є менш впливовими. Цей факт ускладнює формування спільної екологічної групи впливу у ЄС з метою політичного тиску з метою реалізації екологічної модернізації економіки. Тобто успішність екологічної модернізації економіки Євросоюзу системно залежить від внутрішньої спроможності еліт і європейських суспільств реалізувати цей курс та від сприятливої розстановки сил у глобалізованому світі.

Ключові слова: європейська інтеграція, Європейський Союз, екологічна політика, криза фазового переходу, партія зелених

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Relevance of the research topic. From a material point of view, the history of mankind is a change in technological systems that determined the forms of organization of economic life. In the past, many phase crises associated with transitions from one technological system to another have been recorded. The most famous are the Neolithic revolution as a transition to the production economy, the industrial revolution, which opened a period of rapid transformations of industrial development. However, already in the early 1960s, the experts of the “Club of Rome” started talking about the limits of economic growth, which are determined by the limit of various resources. At the turn of the 20th-21st centuries experts of the “Davos Economic Forum” talk about the importance of the transition to an ecologically clean economy. Quantitative and qualitative indicators of such transformation are determined by the Paris Agreement of 2015 on the prevention of climate change. However, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, as well as the escalation of the Russia’s war against Ukraine from February 24, 2022, provoked an increase in the level of inflation and budget deficits in most of the member states of the European Union. The key problem of the ecological modernization of the economy of the European Union countries is the redistribution of financial resources and the stimulation of innovative technologies necessary for the transition to a new economic system. Solving this task depends on political risks and financial constraints. The dialectic of the interaction of these trends determines the success or failure of the ecological modernization of the economies of the European Union states.

Historiographical review. The problems of the study of the economic burden on the economy are highlighted in the classic work of Braudel F. “Material Civilization, Economy and Capitalism. XV-XVIII centuries”. The author gave an example of how the hunting of lions led to an increase in the population of goats in the Levant, which ate the roots of trees in the mountains resulting in an ecological disaster¹. Ecological issues are often subordinated to ideological guidelines in scientific and political discourse. Soros G. considers authoritarianism but not the climate change to be a greater threat to an open society². However, in reality, authoritarian traditions that neglect environmental concerns produce additional challenges to sustainable development.

In the history of the European integration scientific literature records several energy crises that significantly influenced the policy of the European Communities. In the early 1970s, saving energy resources, reducing the share of oil in the energy balance in favor of gas and nuclear energy were defined as ways out of the crisis in the early 1970s. The energy crisis was accompanied by a currency crisis and changes in European financial policy. At the beginning of the 21st century, the European Commission defined a strategy for the

¹ Бродель Ф. Матеріальна цивілізація, економіка і капіталізм. XV-XVIII ст. Том 1: Структура повсякденності: можливе і неможливе. К., 1995. С. 182.

² Сорос Дж. Криза глобального капіталізму. Відкрите суспільство під загрозою. Київ, 1999. С. 15.

development of the EU energy policy in a joint analytical project³. In the mentioned document, problems were set that were not solved until the beginning of the 2020s.

In mid-September 2020, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reported to the European Parliament “On the State of the European Union”. The report was entitled “Building the world we want to live in: Viable union in a fragile world”⁴. Among the priorities of the European Union for the period up to 2027, the strengthening of environmental policy has been identified in order to bring it into line with the provisions of the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. The German Green Party insists on a radical transformation of agrarian policy in order to make agricultural activity neutral to the impact of climate change⁵. Ecology activists traditionally pay attention to the challenges that stimulate agricultural production. We remind you that the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union is the oldest common policy under the influence of powerful lobbying structures. The withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Union and the reduction of revenues to the common budget of the EU stimulated speculations about the possibility of transforming the structure of costs for financing the common agricultural policy of the European Union. On October 21, 2020, the ministers of agriculture of the EU member states agreed on the principles of agricultural policy reform. We are talking about the allocation after 2023 of the majority of subsidies to farmers who have agreed to implement ecological standards in their farms⁶. Of course, the efforts of agrarians alone are not enough for the full realization of the innovative priorities of ecologization of the economy of the member states of the European Union. An even more important segment of this policy is the energy sector. The EU plans to radically change the ratio of “clean” and “dirty” electricity production⁷. Measures of ecological modernization of the economy are also aimed at the field of transport, industry, and mining.

Regarding each of these directions, there are significant differences between the positions of government structures and public opinion in the countries of an “old” Europe and a “new” Europe, if the time of accession of a certain country to the European Union is taken as a criterion. Ecological “green” parties are more influential in the old member states of the European Union. There is a risk of a phase transition crisis from the technologies of the industrial structure of the economy to new ecological technologies with the possible digitalization of the economy and the development of robotics in production.

³ Європейська Комісія: Огляд енергетичних потреб Європейської Спільноти до 2010 року. К., 2000. С. 4.

⁴ EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen changiert in Ihrer Rede zur Lage der EU zwischen Zweckoptimismus und überraschend deutlichen Ansagen. URL: <https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/europa/2075408-reden-wir-europa-nicht-schlecht.html>

⁵ Grüne wollen radikalen Umbau der Agrarpolitik. URL: <https://www.deutschlandpolitik.de/eu-gruene-wollen-radikalen-umbau-der-agrarpolitik.1939.de.html>

⁶ EU-Staaten einigen sich auf Agrarreform. URL: <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article218271184/luxemburg-eu-staaten-einigen-sich-aus-agrarreform.html>

⁷ EU energy in figures. URL: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/99fc30eb-co6d-11e8-9893-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-78277087>

The price of such an innovation may be the aggravation of social contradictions associated with a higher rate of job reduction compared to the creation of new “green” jobs. This state of affairs can provoke the strengthening of political populists and the exacerbation of social and political contradictions⁸. This trend changes the social structure of “post-industrial” European societies and modernizes the agenda of current politics. The large-scale war in the heart of Europe, which acquired a new quality after February 24, 2022, provoked the appearance of additional risks and security challenges. In February 2023, the report of the organizers of the “Munich Conference on International Security” stated the security problems of Ukrainian nuclear plants under conditions of intense hostilities⁹. On the other hand, the introduction of forced economic and energy sanctions of the European Union against the Russian Federation accelerated the transformation of the European energy industry to new parameters of functioning in conditions of global instability.

The purpose of the article is to highlight the peculiarities of the ecological transformation of the economy of the member states of the European Union under the conditions of political and financial restrictions of our time. The main goals of scientific and technical policy are the following: ensuring the quantity and quality of highly qualified workforce, improving the quality of scientific research and its connection with business, creating favorable opportunities for innovation, effective protection of intellectual property. The EU tries to coordinate the national science and technology policy of the member states. However, in terms of the level of development of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, the European Union is inferior to the USA and Japan. The European Union remains a world leader in the global fight against climate change. The goal is to become “ecologically neutral” by 2050, that is not to harm the environment. A system of environmental monitoring and information exchange has been created. During the 1990s, ecological policy became a priority area of the EU activity. In 1999, an ecological certification system was introduced for the EU. The key tasks of the EU’s ecological policy are defined as the following: combating climate change, ensuring biological diversity, limiting the negative impact of production on people’s health and quality of life, rational use of natural resources, and waste processing. Ecological policy is in the sphere of joint competence of the member states and the EU bodies.

Common energy policy is an important area of activity of the EU. The European integration began with the coal and nuclear energy industries. But this did not lead to the formation of a common energy policy within the European communities. It was necessary to go through additional stages of building a common market in order to actualize such a need. In 1988, the program of liberalization of the internal energy market of Western European states was adopted. The goal was the formation of a common energy and gas market. Since 1998 this process has moved into the sphere of real politics.

⁸ Dröge Susanne. Zurück in die Zukunft? Die internationale Klimapolitik 2021. Neue Konstellationen für die europäische Klimadiplomatie. SWP-Aktuell. Nr 13. Februar 2021. S. 8.

⁹ «Re: Vision». Munich Security Report. Münich. 2023. S. 74.

In September 2009, the third energy market reform package was adopted. The strategic tasks were defined as simplifying the entry of new energy producers into the market, destroying the monopoly structure of the market, giving the consumer the right to freely choose a supplier, giving third-party companies access to transportation and distribution networks, dividing the functions of the producer, transporter, and supplier of energy services.

Currently, market liberalization is far from ideal. Separate liberalized national markets have been created instead of the single EU energy market. The demonopolization process did not take place, because many EU countries pursue a protectionist policy in the field of energy, and the level of competition is insufficient. As a result, gas and electricity prices vary significantly across the EU member states. In the early 2000s, there was adapted a package of energy and climate measures. The tasks were defined as achieving high efficiency of the sector due to increased competition, environmental stability and resource stability. In 2009, the EU directive on the development of alternative sources of electricity was adopted. The key task is to diversify sources of gas and oil supplies to the EU countries.

EU member states are deeply integrated into the global division of labor. The EU has a differentiated structure of foreign trade. Before the global economic crisis of 2008, EU countries accounted for 36% of world exports and 33% of world imports of machinery and equipment¹⁰. The EU occupies a strong position in the export of aviation equipment and transport engineering. The European Union is also a leading exporter of chemical goods, including pharmaceuticals. Maintains leading positions in the export of agricultural products and in the world trade in services. Almost 70% of trade is in the Common Market. The USA accounts for 21% of exports and 13% of EU imports. China accounts for 16% of imports and only 6% of EU exports. If the EU has a positive balance in trade with the USA, it has a negative balance in trade with China. In 2008, Russia accounted for 11% of EU imports and 8% of EU exports, while, for example, “small” Switzerland accounted for 7% of EU exports and 5% of imports. Japan’s share in EU trade did not exceed 5% at that time¹¹. The tools of the EU’s foreign trade remain the unified customs tariffs and the unified customs policy. The most favored nation regime applies to all member countries of the World Trade Organization. However, in trade with developing countries, the EU uses quantitative restrictions, special protective measures to protect its own producers, anti-dumping measures, subsidizing exports to other countries, special standards and norms.

Environmental policy becomes part of the subsidiarity policy of the European Union, when problems must be solved not only at the level of strategic decision-making, but also in European regions and communities. The regional policy of the EU is designed to consolidate regions into a single integration complex, to ensure a rational combination of common interests with the interests of individual states. There is no goal to completely

¹⁰ Statistics governance and quality framework. URL: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/html/index.en.html>

¹¹ Import, export and trade in the European Union. URL: https://european-union.europa.eu/live-work-study/import-and-export_en

equalize all regions, because inequality is a characteristic of a market economy and an incentive for development. Funds are not redistributed between regions within the EU, as federal states do. Regions in need of assistance can use EU structural funds. The European Regional Development Fund was established in 1975, the European Social Fund in 1960, the Consolidation Fund and the European Investment Bank in 1993. Operating principles of structural funds: 1) subject and territorial concentration of efforts on the selection of a limited number of areas of activity and selection; 2) multi-year programmatic approach, 3) partnership of authorities at all levels, 4) addition of EU funds to national resources of regional policy. The implementation of the environmental policy of the European Union depends on the effective functioning of this level of government.

The main directions of regional policy are convergence, that is, promoting the development of territories with a low level of well-being, competitiveness, helping territories with structural problems, developing human capital, combating long-term unemployment, and creating professional retraining centers. Socio-economic convergence is the second expenditure item of the EU common budget after agrarian policy. In the 2007–2013 budget, 300 billion euros were spent on these needs¹². After the EU enlargement in 2004, 2007, 2013, it was decided that the amount of financial assistance cannot exceed 4% of the gross domestic product, otherwise inflation can be accelerated and disparities in the national budgets of the new EU member states can be created. As a result of the expansion, Poland became the main recipient of aid under these funds. Large expenditures go to Italy, East Germany, Portugal, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

The goals of the common agricultural policy of the EU are the following: to increase the productivity of agriculture, to ensure social protection of farmers, to stabilize agricultural product markets, food security, to maintain reasonable consumer prices for agricultural products, and provide export subsidies. For this purpose, in 1962, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund was created. The guarantee sector purchases products from farmers at fixed prices, maintains intervention stocks, and subsidizes exports. The orientation section solves the structural tasks of the industry, i.e. rationalization of production, protection of soils, improvement of product quality and guarantees of its sales. This system was fully implemented in July 1968. In 1988, an attempt was made to limit overproduction. Farmers began to receive subsidies for refusing from growing certain types of products. The accession to the EU of agrarian countries such as Poland actualized the task of reforming the common agrarian policy. A system of targeted subsidies to farmers was introduced in order to stimulate the reduction of the area of cultivated land, the reduction of the intensity of their use and the reduction of the volume of agricultural products.

During 1993–2003, subsidy costs decreased from 26 to 10 billion euros, and export subsidies from 10 to 3 billion euros. However, the agricultural sector of the countries that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 is less profitable, and prices for agricultural

¹² Pew Research of European Union. URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/the-european-union/>

products are lower than in the EU-15 member countries. Moreover, many Central European farmers could not sell their products due to their non-compliance with EU standards. It was decided that the amount of subsidies depends on compliance with labor standards on the farm, use of land use standards, animal husbandry conditions, safety and quality of products. By 2013, expenditures on subsidies were reduced by 30%. At that time, there were 21 organized agricultural markets in the EU (most important grains, meat, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, wine, sugar)¹³. The issues of increasing the competitiveness of the agricultural sector (modernization of production and human capital) are being resolved, the agricultural environment and landscapes are being improved, as well as the quality of life in the villages. The reform of the common agricultural policy of the European Union for the budget period until 2027 will be focused on this. However, the adoption of this budget strategy is complicated by many crisis factors. Until the final summing up of the results of the presidential elections in the USA, the fate of the trade agreement between Great Britain and the European Union remained uncertain. British Prime Minister B. Johnson congratulated J. Biden on his victory in the elections on November 3, 2020, even before recognizing the defeat of D. Trump. The victory of the candidate of the Democratic Party made the British position more compromising on the new trade agreement with the EU. Completion of the withdrawal procedure of Great Britain deprived the common budget of the EU of significant revenues. The corresponding sequestration was waiting for the expenditure articles of the budget. Subsidies to farmers have become smaller in countries that have become members of the European Union relatively recently¹⁴. There is a need to find a package compromise regarding the draft EU budget until 2027. That is, the successful ecological modernization of the economy of the member states of the European Union depends both on the financial resource support for the implementation of overdue reforms, and on the positioning of the European Union in the world. On February 9-10, 2023, the EU summit debated the plan for the ecological modernization of the economy, taking into account the increase in subsidies in the USA. The question of whether the European Union will have enough funds to solve environmental problems and the forced increase in military spending remains open.

Conclusions. The ecological modernization of the economy of the member states of the European Union is associated with the risks of a phase transition crisis from one economic structure to another. This transition has its socio-political price and complications. The key criteria for the success or failure of this project are the reform of the common agricultural policy of the European Union, the achievement of high environmental standards in the energy sector, transport and industry. By the end of 2020, a compromise was reached regarding the revision of the agricultural policy of the European Union. EU countries' strategies for the energy sector are different. France remains a

¹³ Heydemann Günter, Vodicka Karel (Hrsg.). Vom Ostblock zur EU. Systemtransformationen 1990-2012 im Vergleich. Göttingen, 2013. S. 280.

¹⁴ Грубінко А.В., Мартинов А.Ю. Європейський Союз після BREXIT: продовження історії. Тернопіль, 2021. С. 161.

supporter of nuclear energy. Germany is closing nuclear plants, which causes the need to increase energy production at thermal plants and from alternative sources of electricity. Achieving new environmental standards in industry poses a question of social and political stability, as there is a risk of job cuts in old industrial sectors and slow creation of new jobs. Such disproportions can negatively affect the political support of “green” environmental political parties, primarily in the countries of an “old” Europe. The political positions of the “green” in the countries of an “new” Europe are less influential. This fact complicates the formation of a joint environmental group of influence in the EU for the purpose of political pressure in order to implement ecological modernization of the economy. The question of strengthening or weakening the competitiveness of the economy of the European Union is open, if ecological modernization will be carried out only by the European Union, and not by other economic centers, such as China, the USA, India, Japan. In October 2020, the Fifth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee approved the 14th five-year plan for 2021–2025 and the strategy until 2035 under the conditions of self-reliance and external openness. China is not ready to spend as much as the European Union on the ecological modernization of the Chinese economy, because the costs of maintaining the socio-political stability of Chinese society remain large. Joseph Biden will return the United States to the Paris Climate Agreement. However, the question of whether there is a general American political consensus regarding the rapid ecological modernization of the American economy remains open. The experience of D. Trump’s presidency in 2017–2020 proved the fact of stimulating the American economy at the expense of abandoning the standards of international ecological agreements. That is, the success of the ecological modernization of the European Union’s economy systematically depends on the internal ability of elites and European society to implement this course and on a favorable balance of forces in the globalized world.

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**GERMAN-UKRAINIAN COOPERATION:
ACTIVITIES OF THE FUND “MEMORY, RESPONSIBILITY AND FUTURE”**

Viktoria Kontsur***Mykola Kontsur******Abstract**

The article examines the transformation of the activities of the Fund “Memory, Responsibility and Future” (germ. “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”) of the Federal Republic of Germany and German-Ukrainian cooperation in the cultural and educational sphere. The experience of interaction between former enemies during the Second World War is considered in relation to extremely painful issues of historical memory in Ukraine and Germany in order to overcome historical traumas.

During the Second World War, Ukraine was one of the main regions for the export of Ostarbeiters to Nazi Germany. For a long time, a large proportion of forced laborers were not subject to the German compensation law. Only at the end of the 20th century, the German and international public raised the issue of payments to former forced laborers. In 1998, the Bundestag decided to create a fund to pay compensation with financial participation from German industry. The fund paid one-time compensation primarily to former concentration camp prisoners and deported civilian workers from Central and Eastern Europe. Out of the total amount of compensation of 4.4 billion euros, Ukraine received more than 400 million euros.

In 2010, the payments were completed, but the fund continued and expanded its activities. Today, the fund supports the implementation of international projects aimed at strengthening partnership and cooperation between Germany and countries that suffered from the consequences of National Socialism. The fund's annual reports show that Ukraine is the undisputed leader among the partner countries in the implementation of these projects.

Such fruitful cooperation became possible thanks to the activities of Ukrainian organizations, unions and funds regarding comprehensive support and assistance from the state and society to the victims of Nazism. The active partners of the German fund “Memory, Responsibility and Future” are the Ukrainian Union of Prisoners-Victims of Nazism and the Ukrainian Cultural Fund.

Among the products of this international cooperation are an online archive and an online educational platform that can be effectively used for scientific and educational purposes.

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Thus, the fund became a kind of expression of the political and moral responsibility of the German state for the damages caused by the National Socialist regime, and a cultural and educational bridge between the former irreconcilable enemies.

Keywords: Germany, Ukraine, Fund EVZ, forced laborers, payment of compensation, international project

НІМЕЦЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКА СПІВПРАЦЯ: ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ ФОНДУ «ПАМ'ЯТЬ, ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЬ І МАЙБУТНЄ»

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Анотація

У статті досліджено трансформацію діяльності Фонду «Пам'ять, відповідальність і майбутнє» (нім. «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft») Федеративної Республіки Німеччина та німецько-українську співпрацю у культурно-освітній сфері. Розглянуто досвід взаємодії колишніх ворогів часів Другої світової війни щодо надзвичайно болючих питань формування історичної пам'яті українського та німецького народів з метою подолання історичних травм.

Протягом Другої світової війни Україна була одним з основних регіонів вивезення оstarбайтерів до нацистської Німеччини. Значна частина підневільних працівників тривалий час не підпадала під німецьке компенсаційне право. Лише наприкінці ХХ ст. питання виплат колишнім підневільним робітникам було порушено німецькою та міжнародною громадськістю. У 1998 р. Бундестаг прийняв рішення створити фонд для виплат компенсацій колишнім підневільним робітникам за фінансової участі німецької промисловості. Фонд EVZ виплатив одноразові компенсації насамперед колишнім в'язням концтаборів та депортованим цивільним робітникам із Центральної та Східної Європи. Із загальної суми компенсацій 4,4 мільярда євро Україна отримала понад 400 мільйонів євро.

Після завершенню здійснення виплат у 2010 р. Фонд EVZ продовжив і розширив свою діяльність. Сьогодні він сприяє реалізації міжнародних проєктів, спрямованих на підсилення партнерської взаємодії й співпраці між Німеччиною та країнами, які постраждали від наслідків націонал-соціалізму. Щорічні звіти Фонду EVZ засвідчують, що серед країн-партнерів із реалізації зазначених проєктів Україна є беззаперечним лідером.

Така плідна співпраця стала можливою завдяки активній роботі українських організацій, спілок та фондів щодо всебічної підтримки й допомоги з боку держави та суспільства жертвам нацизму. Активними партнерами німецького Фонду «Пам'ять, відповідальність і майбутнє» є Українська спілка в'язнів-жертв нацизму та Український культурний фонд.

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Одним із продуктів міжнародної співпраці стали онлайн-архів і навчальна онлайн-платформа, які можуть бути ефективно використані для наукових та освітніх цілей.

Таким чином, Фонд EVZ став своєрідним виразником політичної й моральної відповідальності німецької держави за заподіяні націонал-соціалістським режимом збитки та культурно-освітнім містком між колишніми непримиренними ворогами.

Ключові слова: Німеччина, Україна, Фонд EVZ, підневільні працівники, виплата компенсацій, міжнародний проект

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URL: <https://konsensus.net.ua/index.php/konsensus/article/view/72>

Актуальність дослідження. Культурно-освітня співпраця держав є одним з інструментів розбудови міжнародних відносин та ефективним засобом розширення джерел та методів вивчення іноземних мов, історії та культури. Прикладом такого формату взаємодії є діяльність Фонду «Пам'ять, відповідальність і майбутнє» (нім. «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft» (далі – Фонд EVZ)) Федеративної Республіки Німеччина в Україні, який було засновано для організації виплати компенсацій колишнім підневільним робітникам та особам, які постраждали від націонал-соціалізму під час Другої світової війни. Також невіддільною складовою усебічного та комплексного дослідження історії Другої світової війни та її наслідків є вивчення досвіду взаємодії колишніх ворогів щодо надзвичайно болючих питань формування історичної пам'яті українського та німецького народів на тернистому шляху подолання історичних травм.

Історіографічний огляд. Доробок наукової літератури, яка прямо чи опосередковано стосується проблеми примусової праці, є досить численним. Історію праці іноземних робітників досліджували Зіґрід та Вольфганг Якобейт (Sigrid Jacobeit, Wolfgang Jacobeit)¹. Особливості організації праці іноземних сезонних та вимушених робітників, починаючи з кінця XIX ст., вивчав Ульріх Херберт (Herbert Ulrich)². Система експлуатації та приниження у нацистській Німеччині та в окупованій Європі представлена у книзі Марка Шперера (Mark Spoerer). Автор дає вичерпну інформацію про походження вимушених робітників, особливості їх вербування, умови життя та роботи³.

¹ Jacobeit S., Jacobeit W. *Illustrierte Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte Deutschlands 1900–1945*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1995. 419 s.

² Herbert U. *Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des «Ausländer-Einsatzes» in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches*. Berlin-Bonn: Verlag Dietz, 1985. 494 s.; Herbert U. *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland, 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter*. Berlin-Bonn: Verlag Dietz, 1986. 272 s.

³ Spoerer M. *Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und Haftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939–1945*. Stuttgart; München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt DVA, 2001. 332 s.

Серед бібліографії проблеми особливу увагу привертає дослідницька робота американських науковців Джона Бейєра (John C. Beyer) і Стівена Шнайдера (Stephen A. Schneider) «Примусова праця у Третньому рейху», яка висвітлює статистичні дані щодо використання примусової праці у нацистській Німеччині. Автори також дали оцінку тим збиткам, яких зазнали жертви примусової праці. Ця інформація була використана під час переговорів між юристами, які представляли колишніх примусових робітників, та представниками німецьких корпорацій. Саме у результаті цієї діяльності й було створено компенсаційний Фонд EVZ, про який буде йти мова у нашому дослідженні⁴. Людольф Хербст (Ludolf Herbst) і Константин Гослер (Constantin Goschler) докладно висвітили весь шлях організації виплат компенсацій у Федеративній Республіці Німеччина від виникнення закону про компенсацію в американській окупаційній зоні до порушення питання щодо тих категорій іноземних працівників, які так і не отримали права на компенсацію⁵.

Попри наявність значного наукового доробку із проблеми підневільної праці у Третньому рейху, вона все ще потребує подальшої розробки. В українській історіографії залишаються малодослідженими питання виплати компенсацій жертвам націонал-соціалізму та культурно-освітня співпраця України та Німеччини щодо збереження у колективній пам'яті досвіду тих, хто пережив це випробування, й осмислення трагедії наступними поколіннями.

Мета статті. У межах цього дослідження ми ставимо за мету розглянути на прикладі діяльності Фонду «Пам'ять, відповідальність і майбутнє» німецько-українську співпрацю щодо виплат компенсацій жертвам націонал-соціалізму та форми міжнародної культурно-освітньої роботи, яку підтримує Фонд EVZ.

В умовах націонал-соціалізму з 1939 р. і до кінця Другої світової війни близько 8,4 млн. іноземних цивільних підневільних робітників і 4,5 млн. військовополонених залучалися до примусових робіт у концентраційних і трудових таборах, інших місцях ув'язнення, на промисловості та в сільському господарстві Німеччини. Із загальної кількості іноземних цивільних підневільних робітників 5,5 млн. (65,5%) становили остарбайтери (нім. *Ostarbeiter* – східний працівник), з-поміж яких 30% становили діти віком від 10 до 14 років⁶. Україна була одним з основних регіонів вивезення остарбайтерів до нацистської Німеччини.

Значна частина підневільних працівників тривалий час не підпадала під німецьке компенсаційне право. Федеральний закон про компенсації набув чинності у 1953 р., але лише наприкінці XX ст. питання виплат колишнім підневільним робітникам було порушено німецькою та міжнародною громадськістю. У 1998 р. Бундестаг прийняв рішення створити фонд для виплат компенсацій колишнім підневільним робітникам за фінансової участі німецької промисловості. Після

⁴ Beyer J.C., Schneider S.A. *Forced Labour under Third Reich*. Nathan: Associates Inc., 1999. Part 1. 24 p.

⁵ Herbst L. *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* / ed. by C. Goschler. Berlin/München/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019. 428 s.

⁶ Полян П. Остарбайтеры. ЖЗ. URL: <https://magazines.gorky.media/zvezda/2005/6/ostarbajtery.html>

тривалих міжнародних переговорів та відповідно до федерального закону 12 серпня 2000 р. було створено Фонд «Пам'ять, відповідальність, майбутнє», до якого німецькі підприємства внесли близько 5 млрд. марок для виплат компенсацій колишнім підневільним робітникам та іншим жертвам нацизму. Виплати було розпочато після 30 травня 2001 р.⁷

Попри те, що під час організації виплат компенсацій Фонд EVZ намагався мінімізувати бюрократичну складову, уникаючи судових процесів, небагато колишніх підневільних працівників дожили до кінця цього тривалого процесу. Фонд EVZ виплатив одноразові компенсації насамперед колишнім в'язням концтаборів та депортованим цивільним робітникам із Центральної та Східної Європи. Ці компенсації відрізнялися у залежності від країни походження і тяжкості табірних умов перебування:

- в'язні концтаборів та гетто – 7669 євро;
- в'язні виховно-трудових таборів та інших місць ув'язнення – від 3068 до 7669 євро;
- підневільні робітники у промисловості – 2556 євро;
- робітники фермерських господарств і діти-ув'язнені – від 536 до 2235 євро.

У разі смерті постраждалих після 1999 р. право на компенсацію набували їхні родичі⁸.

Понад 1,66 млн. осіб (що складає лише 12,77% від 13 млн. примусових робітників) у майже 100 країнах світу отримали в цілому 4,4 млрд. євро, з яких Україна отримала понад 400 млн. євро⁹. На думку Федерального президента Німеччини Хорста Келера (Horst Köhler), здійснення цих виплат сприяли тому, «що страждання були визнані стражданнями, а вина і відповідальність отримали також відчутне матеріальне вираження»¹⁰. Таким чином, Фонд EVZ став своєрідним виразником політичної та моральної відповідальності німецької держави за заподіяні націонал-соціалістським режимом збитки.

Однак далеко не всі жертви змогли отримати компенсацію. Наприклад, інтерновані італійські солдати або радянські військовополонені, які, хоча і були залучені до примусових робіт, не могли розраховувати ні на компенсацію, ані на гуманітарну допомогу, тільки тому, що були військовополоненими¹¹.

⁷ Компенсации – дополнительная информация. Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”. URL: <https://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/ru/zwangsarbeit/entschaedigung/entschaedigung-2/index.html>

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ Фюрстенау М., Агаев В. Компенсации подневольным работникам закончились, фонд ведет гуманитарные проекты. *Deutsche Welle*. URL: <http://surl.li/kmvaq>

¹⁰ История создания Фонда EVZ. Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”. URL: <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/ru/kto-my/istorija/istorija-sozdaniya/>

¹¹ Фюрстенау М., Агаев В. Компенсации подневольным работникам закончились, фонд ведет гуманитарные проекты. *Deutsche Welle*. URL: <http://surl.li/kmvaq>

2 серпня 2010 р. «Deutsche Welle» повідомила про завершення виплат компенсацій за примусову працю на нацистську Німеччину¹². По завершенню здійснення виплат Фонд EVZ продовжив і розширив свою діяльність. Сьогодні він сприяє реалізації міжнародних проєктів, спрямованих на підсилення партнерської взаємодії й співпраці між Німеччиною та країнами, які постраждали від наслідків націонал-соціалізму.

Переважна більшість проєктів реалізується за трьома основними напрямками:

- аналіз історичних подій (проєкти, що заохочують молодь до вивчення подій націонал-соціалістичного минулого, а також до збереження у пам'яті людства їх наслідків);

- демократія та права людини (підтримка міжнародних ініціатив, спрямованих на посилення засад демократії та зміцнення прав людини);

- гуманітарні ініціативи з метою надання допомоги тим, хто пережив націонал-соціалістичну диктатуру (міжнародні проєкти допомоги жертвам націонал-соціалізму на місцях)¹³.

Станом на серпень 2023 р. з моменту заснування Фонду EVZ було профінансовано 6238 проєктів на суму 189 887 656 євро¹⁴. Щорічні звіти Фонду EVZ засвідчують, що серед країн-партнерів із реалізації зазначених проєктів Україна є беззаперечним лідером. Для наочної ілюстрації цього наведемо дані за 2011 р.: Україна – 36 проєктів, Білорусь – 26, Ізраїль – 8, Польща – 8, Росія – 8, Чехія – 9. Найбільше (56) проєктів в Україні було реалізовано у 2015 р.¹⁵

Така плідна співпраця стала можливою і завдяки активній роботі українських організацій, спілок та фондів щодо всебічної підтримки й допомоги з боку держави та суспільства жертвам нацизму. Розглянемо декілька форматів українсько-німецької співпраці у рамках проєктів Фонду EVZ.

Українська спілка в'язнів-жертв нацизму (УСВЖН) (створена у 1991 р.) протягом багатьох років успішно співпрацює з Фондом EVZ. В основі спільної роботи Фонду EVZ та УСВЖН лежить виховання молодого покоління, протидія проявам расизму та ксенофобії, запобігання перекручуванню історичних фактів. УСВЖН представлена в Опікунській раді Фонду EVZ, що надало можливість членам спілки звернутись до керівництва Фонду EVZ у грудні 2015 р. щодо надання допомоги жертвам нацистських переслідувань, які мешкають на невідконтрольних уряду

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Фонд «Пам'ять, відповідальність і майбутнє». Посольство Федеративної Республіки Німеччина. URL: <https://kiew.diplo.de/ua-uk/service/erinnerung-verantwortung-zukunft/1270084>

¹⁴ Цифры финансирования проэкта. Stiftung «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft». URL: <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/>

¹⁵ Отчеты о деятельности. Stiftung «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft». URL: <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/ru/servis/infoteka/otchety-o-deyatelnosti/>

України територіях Донецької та Луганської областей. Як результат згаданої ініціативи, їм було виділено допомогу в розмірі 150 тис. євро¹⁶.

Надзвичайно плідним стало партнерство Українського культурного фонду та Фонду EVZ у рамках програми «MEET UP! Німецько-українські зустрічі молоді», яка стартувала у 2019 р. Метою цього партнерства є посилення українсько-німецької співпраці, спільний пошук відповідей на виклики сучасного світу, підтримка культурного діалогу, створення українсько-німецьких проєктів у галузях культури та мистецтва¹⁷. За досить короткий час дії програми «MEET UP!» Фондом EVZ було підтримано 180 проєктів, у яких взяли участь більш як 6000 осіб з України та Німеччини¹⁸, що засвідчує значну інтенсифікацію відносин Німеччини з Україною через надання підтримки молодим людям з активною позицією, вихідцям із Німеччини та України. Така діяльність є запорукою встановлення та збереження у майбутньому порозуміння між народами.

У рамках освітньої програми «Молодь пам'ятає» молодим людям надається можливість критично поглянути на історію. Програма фокусується на транснаціональному вивченні історичних місць, де нацистський режим здійснював переслідування та знищення своїх жертв, а також на питаннях європейської культури та історичної пам'яті. Посередництвом цієї програми відбувається фінансування меморіальних комплексів, навчальних закладів та неурядових організацій у Німеччині, Європі та Ізраїлі.

Серед проєктів, реалізованих протягом останніх років за участі України, варто відзначити проєкт «Культури історичної пам'яті», присвячений розходженням історичних наративів на пострадянському просторі. У період політичної напруги (2021-2022 рр.) Фонд EVZ здійснював спробу налагодити діалог, запросивши молодих педагогів та активістів з Німеччини, Білорусі, Росії та України до спільної розробки підходів та методів роботи з різними історичними наративами у країнах-учасниках. За допомогою інноваційних гібридних форматів та нових підходів до увічнення пам'яті цей проєкт був покликаний зробити внесок у становлення транснаціональної європейської культури історичної пам'яті¹⁹.

Одним із продуктів міжнародної співпраці стали онлайн-архів та навчальна онлайн-платформа, розташовані на сайті Фонду EVZ. Ці ресурси можуть бути ефективно використані для наукових та освітніх цілей. Архів інтерв'ю «Примусова

¹⁶ Демидов М. УСВЖН – 30 років! Українська спілка в'язнів-жертв нацизму /УСВЖН/. URL: <http://usvzn.com/?p=4929>

¹⁷ УКФ розпочав нову міжнародну співпрацю. Український культурний фонд. URL: https://ucf.in.ua/news/2019_09_27

¹⁸ Програма підтримки MEET UP! Youth for Partnership. Stiftung «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft». URL: <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/ru/chto-my-podderzhivaem/sfera-dejatelnosti-i-klastery/obrazovanie-dvizhushchaja-sila-budushchego/meet-up-youth-for-partnership/>

¹⁹ Програма підтримки Молодежь помнит. Stiftung «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft». URL: <https://www.stiftung-evz.de/ru/chto-my-podderzhivaem/sfera-dejatelnosti-i-klastery/obrazovanie-dvizhushchaja-sila-budushchego/molodezh-pomnit/>

праця 1939–1945» містить близько 600 аудіо- та відеоінтерв'ю з колишніми працівницями та працівниками з 26 країн, які змушені були працювати на націонал-соціалістичну Німеччину. Інтерв'ю супроводжуються транскриптами, перекладами (англійською, німецькою, російською та чеською мовами), фотографіями та короткими біографіями.

Застосовуючи метод усної історії та усноісторичні дослідження, укладачі розробили також онлайн-платформу «Навчання на основі інтерв'ю», яка дозволяє використовувати на заняттях з історії архівні ресурси. До 25-хвилинних біографічних фільмів розроблено завдання та дібрано супровідні матеріали. Крім того, на платформі розміщено фільм, який розкриває історичний контекст нацистської примусової праці, інформаційні тексти, методичні розробки, а також хронологічну таблицю та словник із зазначеної теми²⁰.

Оскільки архівні та навчальні матеріали доступні декількома мовами, платформа відкриває широкі можливості для застосування методики CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning – вивчення іноземною мовою всіх або декількох предметів шкільної програми) під час вивчення історії. Методика предметно-мовного інтегрування значно підвищує мотивацію учнів до вивчення іноземних мов та, в нашому випадку, історії.

Отже, діяльність Фонду EVZ у сфері освіти сприяє осмисленню історії націонал-соціалізму в цілому і підневільної праці в європейських формах історичної пам'яті зокрема. Систематичне документування свідчень жертв націонал-соціалізму і створення загальнодоступних ресурсів робить їхній досвід невіддільною частиною історичної та політичної освіти, що сприяє подальшому розвитку культур історичної пам'яті.

Висновки. Підбиваючи підсумки нашого дослідження, не можемо не зазначити, що фінансові компенсації, сплачені Фондом EVZ жертвам націонал-соціалізму, мали історичне значення, хоча у фінансовому вимірі були досить символічними й жодним чином не могли відшкодувати тих страждань, яких зазнали примусові робітники Третього рейху. Хочемо сподіватись, що культурно-освітні ініціативи Фонду хоча б певною мірою втішили тих примусових робітників, яким вдалось вижити та донести новим поколінням свої нелегкі життєві історії. Завдяки Фонду тисячі жертв, які постраждали від примусової праці, отримали голос у колективній пам'яті своїх країн та у Німеччині.

Таким чином, німецько-українська партнерська взаємодія, підтримана Фондом EVZ, відкрила нові можливості для поглибленого пізнання і збереження історичної пам'яті про трагедію, яку принесла нашому народу Друга світова війна; встановлення цивілізованого діалогу між країнами, які були непримиренними ворогами під час війни; проговорення травм минулого, пошуку ефективних форматів для партнерства в майбутньому та нових ефективних форматів навчання.

²⁰ «Принудительный труд 1939–1945». Воспоминания и история. Stiftung «Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft». URL: <https://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/ru/index.html>

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MALAYSIA: MAIN FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE**Iryna Krupenya*****Abstract**

The article examines the main priorities of Malaysia's foreign policy and bilateral relations between Malaysia and Ukraine. It was established that in the first years of independence, the foreign policy of Malaysia was mainly in the wake of the foreign policy of the former Great Britain. It was emphasized that the foreign policy of Malaysia underwent the greatest fundamental changes during the rule of M. Mohammad, who served as prime minister twice (1981–2003), (2018–2021). It was established that the main priorities of Malaysia's foreign policy were pragmatism, guaranteeing political stability, readiness for modernization, creating a favourable investment climate, regional cooperation with ASEAN partners and strengthening relations with Muslim countries. Malaysia's current foreign policy priorities are determined by such key factors as its strategic location in the PSA, the country's positioning as a trading nation, as well as its unique demographics.

The article also analyses the current state of interstate relations (political, trade-economic, humanitarian, etc.) between Ukraine and Malaysia and the possibilities of their further development. It has been established that there are many opportunities for further development of mutually beneficial bilateral trade and sectoral cooperation. The position of Malaysia regarding the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was separately investigated.

Keywords: ASEAN, bilateral cooperation, diplomacy, foreign policy, Malaysia, neutrality, peace, position, pragmatism, Russian-Ukrainian war, Southeast Asia (SEA), Ukraine, war

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МАЛАЙЗІЯ: ГОЛОВНІ ПРІОРИТЕТИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ТА ДВОСТОРОННІ ВІДНОСИНИ З УКРАЇНОЮ

Ірина Крупеня*

Анотація

У статті досліджено головні пріоритети зовнішньої політики Малайзії та двосторонні відносини між Україною. Констатовано, що в перші роки незалежності зовнішня політика Малайзії перебувала переважно в руслі зовнішньої політики колишньої Великобританії. Наголошено, що найбільших принципових змін зовнішня політика Малайзії зазнала під час урядування М. Мохаммада, який двічі обіймав посаду прем'єр-міністра (1981–2003), (2018–2021). Встановлено, що основними пріоритетами зовнішньої політики Малайзії були прагматичність, гарантування політичної стабільності, готовність до модернізації, створення сприятливого інвестиційного клімату, регіональне співробітництво з партнерами АСЕАН і зміцненні відносин з мусульманськими країнами. Сучасні зовнішньополітичні пріоритети Малайзії визначаються такими ключовими факторами як стратегічне розташування в ПСА, позиціонуванні країни як торгової нації, а також її унікальної демографії.

У статті проаналізовано також сучасний стан міждержавних зв'язків (політичні, торгово-економічні, гуманітарні тощо) між Україною й Малайзією та можливості їх подальшого розвитку. Встановлено, що є чимало можливостей для продовження розвитку взаємовигідної двосторонньої торгівлі та секторальної співпраці. Окремо досліджено позицію Малайзії щодо загарбницької війни Російської Федерації проти України.

Ключові слова: АСЕАН, війна, двостороння співпраця, дипломатія, зовнішня політика, Малайзія, мир, нейтралітет, Південно-Східна Азія (ПСА), позиція, прагматизм, російсько-українська війна, Україна

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«Malaysia – the Flower of Southeast Asia»

Formulation of the problem of the research. Malaysia – is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country in Southeast Asia and one of the wealthiest and most developed countries, outranked in GNP only by Singapore and oil-rich Brunei. The Federation of Malaya became an independent country on 31 August 1957. On 16 September 1963, the federation was enlarged by the accession of Singapore, Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) and Sarawak. The name “Malaysia” was adopted from that date. Singapore left the federation on 9 August 1965. Malaysia is a federation of 13 states, 9 of which are headed by traditional

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Malay rulers of royal descent (sultans), and three federal territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, Labuan Island). The country's political system is a constitutional monarchy based on the British Westminster parliamentary system. The representative head of state is the sultan. The sultan is chosen every five years from the ranks of the rulers of the nine Sultanates (according to the principle of rotation). The executive power of Malaysia is vested in the cabinet led by the prime minister, who is the head of government.

The peculiarity of the country's economy is that being traditionally commodity-oriented, it underwent a period of transformation to an industrial type, and then to a post-industrial one (oriented, primarily, to the development of the service sector) in a relatively short period of time. The transition from an agrarian to an industrial-oriented economy in Malaysia took place in less than two decades. The main sectors of the economy: the service sector (58% of GDP, the basis of which is information and telecommunication services, wholesale and retail sales, and finance and insurance), industry (22%), mining industry (8%), agriculture (6.5%) and construction (4.5%)¹. Malaysia is the world's number eight producer of electronic chips and microcircuits². In June 2022 the Semicon Southeast Asia chip industry hosted conference in the Malaysian city of Penang to celebrate Penang's reputation as the Silicon Valley of the East. Among others, US giant Intel announced in December 2022 it will invest \$7 bn into the city to build a new chip-packaging and testing factory, creating 9000 jobs. The president of the Malaysia Semiconductor Industry Association Datuk Seri Wong Siew Hai explained reasons why Malaysia attractive to investors – a stable government, compared to other countries; the country's experience and technical expertise: English and Chinese language skills³.

Thereby due to its pragmatic foreign policy, political stability, and the creation of a favourable investment climate, Malaysia is considered one of the successful post-industrial countries of the Southeast Asian subregion, which makes it interesting for detailed research and study⁴.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The outlined research topic is extremely relevant for Ukraine because Malaysia has made a powerful economic breakthrough in a short period of time and turned from a poor colonial country into a prosperous state with a high standard of living of the population. The Malaysian experience of modernizing the economy thanks to a wise and pragmatic foreign policy could serve as an example for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. In Ukraine, studies devoted to the domestic and foreign policy of Malaysia appeared relatively recently. For the first time in

¹ Малайзія. *Посольство України в Малайзії*. 2023. URL: <https://malaysia.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo>

² Cheema R. Top 10 Semiconductor Manufacturing Countries in the World. 2022. URL: <https://yhoo.it/4oesZnA>; Semiconductor Manufacturing by Country. 2023. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/semiconductor-manufacturing-by-country>

³ Malaysia chips in to global industry. *fDi Intelligence*. 2022. URL: <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/malaysia-chips-in-to-global-industry-8o853>

⁴ Крупеня І.М. Еволюція зовнішньополітичних пріоритетів Малайзії (1957–2022 рр.). *Політологічний вісник: збірник наукових праць* / голов. ред. В.Ф. Цвих; Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка. 2022. Випуск 89. С. 214–231. URL: <https://zpv.knu.ua/index.php/pb/article/view/157>

Ukraine, Iryna Krupenya began to investigate the evolution of foreign policy priorities of Malaysia as one of the leaders of the countries of the Southeast Asian subregion and the Islamic world⁵. I. Lossovskiy, First-Class Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine highlighted the Malaysian foreign policy from colonial dependence to regional leadership⁶. The current state of interstate relations between Ukraine and Malaysia and the possibilities of their further development are analyzed in Serhiy Koshoviy's research⁷. Some aspects of the research topic are reflected in the scientific publications of N. Horodnia⁸ and S. Shergin⁹.

The purpose of research is to investigate the main foreign policy priorities of Malaysia which helped transform the country into a post-industrial society and bilateral relations between Ukraine.

Main research results. Modern Malaysia was formed on the basis of dynamic foreign political relations with Great Britain, at least in the first years of independence. Malaysia's history explains the reason for such ties, which lies in its colonial dependence on Great Britain; large British capital in the economy; the presence of a powerful British military contingent on the territory of Malaysia and unwillingness to conduct an independent defense and foreign policy; significant ideological influence of the former metropolis; a significant number of British citizens who remained to work in the state apparatus; absence or shortage of national personnel – experts in foreign policy, limited financial resources and other opportunities.

Malaysia's foreign policy underwent the greatest fundamental changes during the reign of the country's fourth prime minister, Mahathir Mohammad (1981–2003). Although its main directions, goals and principles remained unchanged, it acquired an increasingly pragmatic and economic orientation, characterized by persistent efforts to protect its own rights and interests. One of the main external priorities of Malaysia at that time was the development of South–South cooperation, the active development of bilateral relations with ASEAN partners and the strengthening of relations with Muslim countries. The first years under the power of Prime Minister M. Mohammad were marked by the deterioration of relations with Great Britain. In Malaysia, London's decision to raise tuition fees at British universities for about 16,000 Malaysian students since 1981 was sharply negative. At the

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ Лоссовський І.Є. Зовнішня політика Малайзії: від колоніальної залежності до регіонального лідерства. *Зовнішні справи*. 2010. № 1. С. 34–37; № 2. С. 10–13; Lossovskiy I. Some elements of strategy and prospects of Ukraine's relations with the countries of the East Asian region. *Ukraine Analytica*. 2019. URL: <https://ukraine-analytica.org/some-elements-of-strategy-and-prospects-of-ukraines-relations-with-the-countries-of-the-east-asian-region/>

⁷ Кошовий С. Пріоритетні завдання та механізми розвитку відносин України з Малайзією на сучасному етапі. *Україна дипломатична*. 2020. Випуск XX. С. 539–560. URL: <http://ud.gdip.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/57.pdf>

⁸ Городня Н.Д. АСЕАН як модель регіональної взаємодії держав Південно–Східної Азії. *Гілея: науковий вісник*. 2015. Вип. 99. С. 109–113.

⁹ Шергін С.О. “Золотий” ювілей АСЕАН: досягнення і проблеми розвитку. *Зовнішні справи*. 2017. № 9. С. 5–10.

same time, Great Britain expressed disagreement with the Malaysian government's efforts to strengthen control over the country's natural resources, perceiving it as a covert nationalization. In this situation, the Malaysian leader introduced strict restrictions on the purchase of goods from the UK and the conclusion of contracts with British campaigns. Each such contract required special approval from the Malaysian government. This policy was called "Buy British last". Only M. Mohammad's visit to London in 1983 and his negotiations with the British Prime Minister M. Thatcher somewhat eased the tension in relations between the countries. Under conditions of worsening relations with the former metropolis, the Malaysian Prime Minister, seeking to use the experience of economic development of such successful countries as Japan and South Korea, announced a new foreign policy initiative – "Face to the East", which provided for the deepening of relations and intensive development of cooperation with these countries.

In the 1980s, the Malaysian government initiated independent foreign policy priorities, taking into account the favourable geopolitical situation in the region, in particular: rethinking views on relations with China and establishing diplomatic relations in May 1974; emphasis was placed on regionalism and diversification of investment following the fall of the Saigon regime of South Vietnam and the reunification of that country in 1975, which effectively ended the American military presence in the Southeast Asian subregion and no longer had to choose between communist and capitalist ideologies; emphasis was placed on the national development of one's own state.

During the years of stay in power of the next prime ministers of Malaysia, the foreign policy initiatives were clarified and refined. Among the most notable, the following can be singled out: formation of pragmatic responses to modern geopolitical and economic challenges; a more comprehensive and scientific approach to the formulation of Malaysia's official position on one or another international issue; establishing personal contacts with colleagues from ASEAN countries; to play a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, OIC and ASEAN; activation of bilateral cooperation with China; formulation of the concept of Islam Hadhari, positioning of Malaysia as a leading example of a progressive and tolerant Islamic state; the noticeable intensification of the Malaysian-American dialogue under the administration of Najib Tun Razak; introducing a massive transformation of the country through the concepts of "One Malaysia", "Serving the People Today", Government Transformation Programme, New Economic Model, "Malaysia Moving Forward"¹⁰.

The current priorities of Malaysia's foreign policy are determined by a number of factors, in particular, dynamic and inevitable changes in the external and security environment, the main of which are: that ASEAN is becoming an arena for major power competition in which its member states may become proxies of major powers; the US-China trade tensions; unresolved territorial disputes between the countries of the SEA subregion; increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints i.e. South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula; maritime security and issues of freedom of

¹⁰ Крупеня І. Еволюція зовнішньополітичних пріоритетів Малайзії (1957–2022 рр.)...

navigation; Islamic and international terrorism; cyber threats; illegal migration; unemployment and economic recession, climate change and more intense and frequent weather events like droughts, floods, cyclones, rising sea level; an increase in energy and food prices due the invasion of Ukraine by Russia¹¹.

Malaysia continues to pursue an independent, principled, and pragmatic foreign policy which values was laid by Mahathir Mohammad. The overarching thrust of modern foreign policy has been to safeguard Malaysia's sovereignty and national interests as well as to contribute meaningfully towards a just and equitable community of nations through the conduct of effective diplomacy. At the same time, the Malaysia's foreign policy is largely influenced and shaped by three key factors, namely its strategic location in Southeast Asia, its attributes as a trading nation as well as its unique demography.

ASEAN remains the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy and the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015 has significantly elevated Malaysia's approach and engagement at the regional level. Concurrently strengthening bilateral and multilateral aspects of Malaysia's engagement with the world will continue to be an important focus. The nation's well-being is founded on the strong and friendly relations with other countries and its commitment to the multilateral system. Malaysia continues to promote a forward-looking and pragmatic foreign policy that facilitates trade, attracts foreign investment as well as projects Malaysia as a stable and peaceful country. As a member of the UN, Malaysia is fully committed to multilateralism in advancing global peace, security, and prosperity. Malaysia's record in peacekeeping operations under the UN is a testimony of its dedication in carrying out the mandate of the international community in advancing global peace and security. At the UN and other international fora, Malaysia will continue to actively participate in the deliberations and efforts toward finding solutions to various global issues. Malaysia will continue with the principles of engagement and cooperation rather than isolationism and unilateral action.

In terms of technical cooperation with other developing countries, Malaysia has worked with other countries through the sharing of its experience and knowledge through various foreign policy mechanisms, namely: the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP), the Langkawi International Dialogue, bilateral humanitarian assistance, public diplomacy programmes.

As a country with a large Muslim majority, Malaysia also gives importance to the solidarity of the Ummah and the spirit of cooperation among the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Malaysia engages actively in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, Group of Seventy Seven (G77), Developing Eight (D8), Asia Middle East Dialogue (AMED), Far East Asia Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

¹¹ The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report. *The ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, Singapore. 2023. URL: <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-State-of-SEA-2023-Final-Digital-V4-09-Feb-2023.pdf>

Malaysia actively promotes the South-South Cooperation among the developing countries and the Muslim world and at the same time Malaysia also advocates the “Prosper thy neighbour” policy to enhance economic relations and cooperation with its neighbouring countries through Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT) and other entities.

The defining principles that will guide Malaysia in conducting its own foreign policy in the future are respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the affairs of other nations; peaceful settlement of disputes; peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit in relations¹².

Determining documents in the field of foreign policy are Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act 1959 (Revised 1988) [Act 348]; Diplomatic Privileges (Vienna Convention) Act 1966 [Act 636]; Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) Act 1999 [Act 595]; Foreign Representative (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1967 (Revised 1995) [Act 541]; International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 [Act 485]; and Chemical Weapons Convention Act 2005 [Act 641].

In addition, the Federal Constitution allows Parliament to make laws related to external affairs that include: treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries; implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries; diplomatic, consular and trade representation; international organisations; participation in international bodies and implementation of decisions taken thereat; extradition, fugitive offenders; admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, the Federation; passports, visas, permits of entry or other certificates, quarantine; foreign and extra-territorial jurisdiction; and pilgrimage to places outside Malaysia¹³.

The main functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are uphold, protect and promote Malaysia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests; monitor and analyse regional and global developments; develop foreign policy and advise the Government on international affairs; coordinate and lead the Government’s position on international issues with other Ministries and Agencies; facilitate other Ministries and Agencies in their international engagements; articulate and advocate the Government’s foreign policy and positions; and provide consular services and assistance¹⁴.

The main strategic thrusts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are strengthen and consolidate bilateral diplomacy; engage effectively in multilateral diplomacy; proactive role in ASEAN; uphold sovereignty and integrity of maritime areas; provide effective and timely

¹² Malaysia’s Foreign Policy. *Official Portal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia*. 2023. URL: <https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/foreign-policy>

¹³ Legal Framework. *Official Portal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia*. 2023. URL: <https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/legal-framework>

¹⁴ Roles and Function. *Official Portal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia*. 2023. URL: <https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/role-function>

services to the Ministry's stakeholders and clients; effective strategic communication and public diplomacy; strive for excellence in human capital¹⁵.

In the first decades of Ukrainian state formation, there was no great interest of Ukrainian political scientists and experts in researching the main priorities of Malaysia's foreign policy and bilateral relations between Ukraine. This was due to the geographical remoteness of the country and the declared desire of Ukraine to join the European civilizational space. Today, we observe the existing disposition of the leadership of Ukraine to expand dialogue and cooperation with Malaysia in all spheres. And the tragic event on July 17, 2014, in the sky over Ukraine, when an airliner of "Malaysian Airlines" was shot down by "the Buk complex" by servicemen of the 53rd Kursk anti-aircraft missile brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, influenced the increase in the attention of bilateral cooperation¹⁶.

Malaysia is one of Ukraine's important partners in the Southeast Asian region. It should be recalled that Malaysia was one of the first countries to recognize independent Ukraine in 1992. On March 3, 2012, both countries celebrated the 20th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations. Over the past two decades, Ukraine and Malaysia have established friendly bilateral relations and mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of international organizations, primarily in the UN and its specialized agencies.

In the period from August 3 to 5, 2016, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko made the first official visit of the Ukrainian Head of State to Malaysia. As part of the visit, the President of Ukraine held meetings and negotiations with the Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib Tun Razak, the Defense Minister of Malaysia Hishammuddin Hussein, visited the national oil and gas company of Malaysia Petroliaam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), the headquarters of the MATRADE Corporation, where he spoke to representatives of Malaysian and Ukrainian companies within the framework of the two-day Ukrainian-Malaysian business forum.

On September 20, 2016, during the 71st session of the UN General Assembly, a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Joint Group to Investigate the MH-17 plane crash took place in New York, which was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Malaysia (Klimkin P.A., Anifa Aman). And exactly one year later, in New York during the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia, the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Government of Malaysia, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of Ukraine regarding political support for the criminal prosecution of those responsible for the downing of flight MH17 on July 17, 2014. On October 29, 2019, the first round of political consultations was held in Malaysia at the level of the leadership of the foreign ministries of

¹⁵ Strategic Thrusts. *Official Portal the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia*. 2023. URL: <https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/strategic-objectives>

¹⁶ Кошовий С. Пріоритетні завдання та механізми розвитку відносин України з Малайзією...

the two states. On October 30, 2019, a deputy group of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on inter-parliamentary relations with Malaysia was formed¹⁷.

Ukraine remains one of the important trading partners of Malaysia among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. During 2021–2022, positive dynamics of bilateral trade were recorded. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the export of goods from Ukraine to Malaysia amounted to \$33,722.5, import to Ukraine \$26,349.4. The positive balance for Ukraine is \$7,373.1. Despite the existing trade turnover, in which there is a tendency to increase the positive balance, the range of trade operations between the countries remains quite limited. The structure of Ukrainian–Malaysian trade is dominated by the supply of raw materials and finished products. In 2022, the main product groups of Ukrainian exports included ferrous metals, base metals, cereals, sunflower oil, vegetables, dairy products, eggs, honey. Instead, the basis of the import structure of Malaysian goods were electrical machinery, rubber, rubber, furniture, palm oil, essential oils, cocoa and its products, grain products, other food products, etc.¹⁸.

There is no agreement on a free trade zone between Ukraine and Malaysia. At the same time, the Trade Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia, signed on August 19, 2002 (entered into force on July 5, 2003), creates a sufficient legal framework for regulating economic relations between the countries. In particular, Article 3 of this Agreement envisages providing the parties with the regime of greatest assistance in relation to all issues of customs regulation and foreign trade formalities regarding the import and/or export of products in accordance with WTO rules.

On the export of goods, the Malaysian Customs applies a customs tariff of 0 to 10 percent under the “ad valorem” system. According to the Customs Law of 1976, for goods that were imported into the country for the purpose of further re-export, the amount of paid export duty is subject to a refund of up to 90%. Enterprises operating in free economic and industrial zones can import raw materials, products, and production equipment without paying customs duties. There are currently in Malaysia 13 Free Industrial Zones (FIZ) and 12 Free Economic Zones (FCZ).

Since July 18, 2012, Malaysia has observer status in the Government Procurement Committee of the World Trade Organization. Exporters need to consider the feasibility of using a local distributor or agent to enter the Malaysian market. A local distributor is usually responsible for learning about tender procedures, customer negotiations, customs clearance, relationships with established wholesalers/retailers, marketing the product directly to large corporations or the government, and providing after-sales service.

To participate in the process of government (public) procurement in Malaysia, foreign companies must establish a local subsidiary and register it in the Ministry of Finance of Malaysia or have a local consulting firm (agent) as a partner. Individual foreign consultants may also be directly appointed where the value of the services does not exceed RM500,000. In addition, it should be noted that in public procurement by the Malaysian

¹⁷ Малайзія. Посольство України в Малайзії. 2023. URL: <https://malaysia.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo>

¹⁸ Державна служба статистики України. 2023. URL: <https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

Government, Government Linked Companies (GLC) or procurement in priority sectors of the economy, preference is given to local agents and/or joint ventures classified as Bumiputera companies. A Bumiputera company must meet the following criteria: incorporated under the Companies Act 1965; the paid-up capital is not less than RM25,000; 100% of shareholders are ethnic Malays (Bumiputra); the composition of the board of directors, management, professional and support staff is more than 51% Bumiputra. At the same time, the Malaysian government uses compensation and other measures to encourage technology transfer, especially in defense procurement¹⁹.

Ukrainian-Malaysian cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian sphere before the introduction of restrictive measures on the entry of foreigners into Malaysia in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic was in positive dynamics, in particular in the field of tourism. So, in 2018, the number of travelers from Ukraine was about 14,500, in 2019 – about 16,000, in 2020, before the introduction of restrictive measures on the entry of foreigners to Malaysia on March 18 due to the COVID-19 pandemic – about 6,000. After the lifting of restrictions on entry to Malaysia, the tourist flow is gradually recovering.

The Embassy of Ukraine in Malaysia conducts systematic work in the humanitarian direction of cooperation. In particular, in 2020–2021, on the Day of Commemoration of the Victims of the Genocide of the Crimean Tatar People, the National News Agency of Malaysia Bernama published articles that gained wide publicity both in Malaysia and abroad. On Flag Day and Independence Day of Ukraine in 2021, the telecommunications tower KL Tower in the capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, was illuminated with the colours of the Ukrainian flag. In 2022, the Saloma Bridge in Kuala Lumpur, as well as the telecommunication tower in Alor Setar, were illuminated in blue and yellow colours.

In October 2020, the Ukrainian-Slovak film “Mezha” was presented as part of the «EU Film Festival». This is the first Ukrainian-made film that was presented in the format of this festival in Malaysia. Given the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the festival was held online. In 2021, the Ukrainian animated film “Mykyta Kozhumiaka” was presented at the festival. In 2022, a Ukrainian film was shown for the first time at the opening ceremony of the “EU Film Festival”. Screenings of the Ukrainian film “Storozhova Zastava” were also held as part of the festival.

In September 2022, the Charge d’Affaires of Ukraine and the Ambassador of the European Union to Malaysia held a joint lecture at the University of Malaya. The embassy is working to involve the Ukrainian community in Malaysia as widely as possible in events related to the history and culture of Ukraine. So, on November 17, 2018, Embassy employees, family members, and the Ukrainian community in Malaysia joined the global campaign to honor the victims of the Holodomor “Let’s light a memorial candle”, since then this event has been held annually²⁰.

¹⁹ Торговельно-економічне співробітництво між Україною та Малайзією. *Посольство України в Малайзії*. 2023. URL: <https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

²⁰ Культурно-гуманітарне співробітництво між Україною та Малайзією. *Посольство України в Малайзії*. 2023. URL: <https://malaysia.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo/463-kulturno-gumanitarne-spivrobitnictvo-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-malajizijeju>

Since October 2018, Ukraine has received the status of a strategic partner and recipient country of the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program, which opens significant opportunities for a new form of bilateral cooperation, in particular by sending Ukrainian specialists of various profiles for internships and studies into Malaysia. The purpose of the Program is the development of human resources by providing opportunities for training in various areas that are important for the development of the country, such as state administration, public administration, diplomacy, health care, education, sustainable development, agriculture, poverty alleviation, investment promotion, IT, banking, etc. The program provides more than 100 short-term specialized courses in 79 educational institutions, many of which are centers of excellence in the field of personnel training. According to the areas of activity, the courses are conducted through almost 50 institutions and departments – National Institute of Public Administration, Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Central Bank of Malaysia, Palm Oil Board of Malaysia, Department of Fisheries, Customs Academy, Fire Service, Department of Civil Aviation, etc.²¹.

The legal framework of Ukrainian-Malaysian relations covers a wide range of different spheres. As of May 2023, there are nine international treaties signed: Agreement on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, 1992; Trade Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia, 2002; Protocol between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia on mutual access to markets of goods and services, 2004; Memorandum of Understanding between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia on Cooperation in the Defence Sphere, 2007; Agreement between Ukraine and Malaysia on the deployment of Malaysian personnel to Ukraine following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, 2014; Agreement between Ukraine and Malaysia on prolongation of the Agreement between Ukraine and Malaysia on the deployment of Malaysian personnel to Ukraine following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, 2016; Treaty between Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 2016; Treaty between Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia on Extradition, 2016; Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 2016 (entered into force on December 29, 2021). On 12th April 2021 the Treaty between Ukraine and the Government of Malaysia on the International Transfer of Prisoners was signed. Ratification of the Treaty is under way. The Treaty will be effective after ratification is fulfilled. Under consideration: drafts intergovernmental agreements on Cooperation in Education, on Visa-Free regime, and on Tourism²².

²¹ Співробітництво у галузі освіти і науки. *Посольство України в Малайзії*. 2023. URL: <https://malaysia.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo/465-naukovo-tehnichne-spivrobitnictvo-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-malajzijeju>

²² Договірні-правова база українсько-малайзійських відносин. *Посольство України в Малайзії*. 2023. URL: <https://malaysia.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo/461-dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-malajzijeju>

An analysis of the official position of Malaysia regarding the condemnation of the brutal war may be compared with the policy of a «toothless tiger». Malaysia Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob said that “the best possible settlement to resolve the conflict could be peaceful eventuate”²³. At the same time, during the vote on March 2, 2022 for UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 regarding the condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the demand for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and the cancellation of the decision to recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, Malaysia voted “for”. Thus, Malaysia supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the absolute observance of international law in relations between countries²⁴.

Conclusions. Malaysia is a unique country in the subregion of Southeast Asia, which, thanks to the right emphasis and pragmatic foreign policy, was able to transform from an agrarian country to a post-industrial one in a fairly short time. This “jump” in economic development owes a lot to the following priorities in foreign policy: pragmatism in the foreign policy that facilitated trade, attracted foreign investment; guaranteeing political stability; readiness for modernization; creation a favourable investment climate; regional cooperation with ASEAN partners; trade and economic cooperation with the USA; rethinking views on relations with China; promotion of the South-South cooperation among the developing countries; advocating the “Prosper thy neighbour” policy to enhance economic relations and cooperation with its neighbouring countries through Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT) and other entities; strengthening relations with Muslim countries and cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. At the same time the Malaysia’s foreign policy is largely influenced and shaped by three key factors, namely its strategic location in Southeast Asia, its attributes as a trading nation as well as its unique demography. As a member of the UN, Malaysia is fully committed in adherence of principals of international law and will continue with the principles of engagement and cooperation rather than isolationism and unilateral action. In terms of technical cooperation with other developing countries, Malaysia has worked with other countries through the sharing of its experience and knowledge through various foreign policy mechanisms which mentioned above. Participation of Malaysia in the Non-Aligned Movement partly explained it’s neutral official position toward Russian aggression into Ukraine. This position reminds the policy of a «toothless tiger».

In the context of bilateral cooperation Malaysia is one of Ukraine’s important partners in the Southeast Asian region. Today, the leadership of Ukraine is willing to expand dialogue and cooperation with Malaysia in all spheres. Given the Russian-Ukrainian war and the state Ukraine is in, the following should be the main priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy within the framework of relations with Malaysia: activation of political

²³ Joanne Lin Is ASEAN a toothless tiger in the face of Ukraine crisis? *Asialink*. 2022. URL: <https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/is-asean-a-toothless-tiger-in-the-face-of-ukraine-crisis>

²⁴ Aggression against Ukraine. *United Nations. Digital Library*. 2022. URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20220303094544/https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039>

contacts with Malaysian politicians in order to explain the real situation in Ukraine to ensure political support for Ukraine on the international arena in the context of the Russian Federation's long-term aggression against Ukraine; strengthening of economic cooperation between countries; expansion of the legal framework of bilateral relations with Malaysia; take measures to prevent the spread of Russian propaganda and the involvement of humanitarian aid for the needs of Ukraine; support Volodymyr Zelenskyy's 10-point Peace formula, which was first voiced at the G20 summit, held in Indonesia in November 2022 to restore of territorial integrity of Ukraine; strengthen bilateral cooperation in the military-technical sphere; the inclusion of Malaysia in the International Contact Group for the Defense of Ukraine («Ramstein» coalition) for the joint victory of the aggressor; encourage academic exchanges, strengthen scientific cooperation in order to inform the scientific circles of Malaysia about the situation in Ukraine and about the consequences of Putin's war; promote the mutual provision of trade privileges and liberalization of the movement of specialists (workers).

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CONCEPTS OF REGIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (20–21 CENTURIES)

Victoria Mykhtunenko*

Abstract

At the current stage, there is no doubt about the role of the “Three Seas” initiative in the regional schedule. However, it is worth noting that one of the impetuses for its actualization was the world confrontation that arose after Russia’s encroachments on the territory of Ukraine (the annexation of Crimea and the instigation of the war in the East of Ukraine). Today, this idea of unification of states in the space from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic seas, as it was at its inception, is actively supported by the USA. Over the past eight years, the attitude towards this program on the part of Germany and the European Union has also changed in a positive direction. In fact, from Poland’s attempt to realize its historical Central European ambitions, the Three Seas initiative was transformed into a prototype of the new Eastern Europe as an integral part of the transatlantic community.

The interest of modern Polish politicians in the concept of “Mizhmorya” is a continuation of the tradition and political thought of Józef Piłsudski. First of all, the concept of “Mizhmorya” is closely related to his view of Poland’s foreign policy in the interwar period. However, its origins go back to the beginning of the 20th century, when there were discussions about Poland’s borders and its role in Europe after it gained independence. The main question concerned Poland’s ability to effectively resist the expansion of neighboring states – Germany and Russia.

The actualization of the “Mizhmorya” concept at the current stage and the transformation of the latter into the “Three Seas” initiative began after the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014. In its current version, the concept includes the southern and eastern vectors of integration. This is a qualitative change, since for many centuries Poland’s foreign policy was formed on the East-West axis, paying much less attention to the North-South axis. It is worth noting that the concept of “Mizhmorya”, which in its current version has turned into “Three Seas”, is not considered as an alternative for membership in the EU and NATO. At the current stage, it does not have an independent character, complementing the generally pro-Western orientation of Poland and its other participants.

In connection with the involvement of 12 countries in the “Three Seas Initiative” and the active role of Croatia, Romania and other states in it, it is losing connection with the original concept of the “Midsea”. It is becoming a format of regional cooperation within the EU, but it has quite strong foundations. Its success also depends on external factors: West-Russia relations, US activity in Central and Eastern Europe, and the difficult-to-predict future of the European Union. One can debate for a long time about the functionality and competitiveness of the new association

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in relation to other numerous regional entities, but one thing remains important: the implementation of the “Three Seas” initiative will start the process of building the energy independence of the countries of the Eastern European region from Russia.

At the summit on June 20, 2022, the countries of the “Three Seas” initiative granted Ukraine the special status of a participating partner of the association. It is worth noting that Ukraine’s membership in “Trimory” is part of our country’s path to membership in the European Union. The concept envisages the development of world trade through the creation of new European logistics corridors, therefore it is important for Ukraine to become one of the transitors along these routes.

Several areas of Ukraine’s cooperation with the participating countries of the “Three Seas” should be highlighted: the creation of the trans-European highway Via Carpathia, where Ukraine will play the role of an important logistics center; energy cooperation, Ukraine has one of the largest gas storages in the region and, using the capabilities of the Poland-Slovakia, Poland-Ukraine interconnectors, it is possible to meet the needs of all countries of the Three Seas; the export of Ukrainian electricity can help the countries of the “Three Seas” to become independent from the energy pressure of the Russian Federation; infrastructure and digitalization (countries should work on expanding checkpoints at the borders of Ukraine). Our state can support many infrastructure projects in the field of digitization and strengthen regional digital connections. So, the “Three Seas” initiative is Ukraine’s perspective to take a place on the European market and completely abandon logistical ties with the occupying country.

Keywords: Regional association, the Three Seas, Intermarium, Central and Eastern European countries, Three Seas Initiative

КОНЦЕПТИ РЕГІОНАЛЬНОГО ОБ’ЄДНАННЯ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ (XX-XXI ст.)

Вікторія Михтуненко*

Анотація

На сучасному етапі вже не має сумнівів в тому, яку роль у регіональному розкладі відіграє ініціатива «Тримор’я». Однак, варто зауважити, що одним із поштовхів до її актуалізації стала світова конфронтація, що виникла після зазіхань Росії на територію України (анексію Криму та розпалювання війни на Сході України). Сьогодні ця ідея об’єднання держав у просторі від Балтійського до Чорного та Адріатичного морів, як і за її виникнення, активно підтримується США. За останні вісім років у позитивний бік змінилося і ставлення до цієї програми з боку Німеччини та Європейського Союзу. По суті, із спроби реалізації Польщею її історичних центральноевропейських амбіцій ініціатива «Тримор’я» трансформувалася в прообраз нової Східної Європи як складової частини трансатлантичного спільноти.

Інтерес сучасного польського політикуму до концепції «Міжмор’я» є продовженням традиції та політичної думки Юзефа Пілсудського. Насамперед, концепція «Міжмор’я» тісно

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пов'язана з його поглядом на зовнішню політику Польщі у міжвоєнний період. Однак її витоки сягають початку ХХ ст., коли велися дискусії про кордони Польщі та її роль у Європі після набуття нею незалежності. Основне питання стосувалося можливості Польщі ефективно чинити опір експансії сусідніх держав – Німеччини та Росії.

Актуалізація концепції «Міжмор'я» на сучасному етапі та трансформація останньої в ініціативу «Тримор'я» почалася після російської агресії в Україні в 2014 році. В актуальному варіанті концепція включає південний та східний вектори інтеграції. Це якісна зміна, оскільки багато століть зовнішня політика Польщі формувалася на осі Схід-Захід, набагато менше уваги приділяючи осі Північ-Південь. Варто зазначити, що концепція «Міжмор'я», яка у поточному варіанті перетворилася на «Тримор'я», не розглядається як альтернатива для членства в ЄС і НАТО. На сучасному етапі вона не має самостійного характеру, доповнюючи загалом прозахідну орієнтацію Польщі та інших її учасників.

У зв'язку із залученням до «Ініціативи трьох морів» 12 країн та активної ролі в ньому Хорватії, Румунії та інших держав вона втрачає зв'язок з первісною концепцією «Міжмор'я». Стає форматом регіонального співробітництва в рамках ЄС, однак має досить міцні підвалини. Її успіх залежить також від зовнішніх чинників: взаємин Захід – Росія, активності США в Центральній та Східній Європі та важко передбачуваного майбутнього Євросоюзу. Можна довго дискутувати з приводу функціональності та конкурентоспроможності нового об'єднання по відношенню до інших численних регіональних утворень, однак важливим залишається одне: реалізація ініціативи «Тримор'я» запустить процес побудови енергетичної незалежності країн східноєвропейського регіону від Росії.

На саміті 20 червня 2022 року країни ініціативи «Тримор'я» надали Україні особливого статусу партнера-учасника об'єднання. Варто зазначити, що членство України у «Тримор'ї» – це частина шляху нашої держави до членства у Європейському Союзі. Концепція передбачає розвиток світової торгівлі шляхом створення нових європейських логістичних коридорів, тому Україні важливо стати одним із транзитерів цими шляхами.

Слід виділити декілька напрямків співпраці України з країнами-учасницями «Тримор'я»: створення трансєвропейської автомагістралі Via Carpathia, де Україна буде відіграти роль важливого логістичного центру; енергетична співпраця, Україна має одні з найбільших сховищ газу в регіоні і, використовуючи можливості інтерконекторів Польща – Словаччина, Польща – Україна, можливо задовольнити потреби всіх країн Тримор'я; експорт української електроенергії може допомогти країнам «Тримор'я» стати незалежним від енергетичного тиску РФ; інфраструктура та діджиталізація (країни мають працювати над розширенням пунктів пропуску на кордонах України). Наша держава може надати підтримку багатьом інфраструктурним проектам у галузі діджиталізації та посилити регіональні цифрові зв'язки. Отож, ініціатива «Тримор'я» – це перспектива України зайняти місце на європейському ринку і повністю відмовитися від логістичних зв'язків з країною-окупантом.

Ключові слова: Регіональне об'єднання, Тримор'я, Міжмор'я, країни Центрально-Східної Європи, Ініціативи трьох морів

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Problem statement. The transformations that took place in Europe at the turn of the 20–21 centuries played an important role and became pivotal in its history. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new countries on the political stage, which pursued a pro-Western development path, led to the “renewal” of European institutional structures and stimulated the formation of a new system of international relations.

In the context of radical changes in the European Union and intensified globalization worldwide, regional security and local associations begin to play an important role. Currently, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the unification of Central and Eastern European countries becomes an even more relevant prospect. However, there are numerous concepts of uniting the Central-Eastern region, which have been formed throughout the twentieth century.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Considering the numerous ideas of uniting the Central and Eastern European countries, it is difficult to understand why, until now, such concepts of regional association have not been implemented. In this study, we will attempt to analyze the aforementioned concepts and explore the prospects for their implementation in the future.

The historiographical basis in the context of the formulated topic is reflected in the works of numerous Ukrainian and foreign researchers, including Avtushenko I., Asaturov S., Vidnyansky S., Hnyazdovsky M., Demchyshak R., Magda Y., Potulski Y., Stepnevsky T. and others.

Main thesis statement. The formation of the concept of “Intermarium” took place in the aftermath of the First World War when Central and Eastern Europe were in a state of crisis. Poland, as a country that had experienced difficult periods in its history, was ready to take on a leadership role in creating a union that would contribute to the restoration and strengthening of the region. At that time, this idea was being developed in research as a component of Polish diplomatic history and was part of the contemporary Polish political thinking. It should be noted that this idea is an integral part of Polish geopolitical tradition.

The origins of this project date back to the Middle Ages when the Jagiellonian concept emerged, uniting four countries under the rule of a single dynasty: Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and Lithuania in the 15th century. Thus, the “Intermarium” project is a long-term idea based on geopolitical factors that affect this subregion. Modern Polish political thought associates the integration project with J. Piłsudski’s idea of creating a confederation with territories such as Poland, the Baltic countries, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Ukraine¹.

Due to its location between Russia and Germany, J. Piłsudski believed that Poland’s return to the status it had lost as a result of partitions was possible through the implementation of two major concepts: the Promethean plan, which aimed to weaken Russia as a country that posed a threat to all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe,

¹ Міщук В. Національні інтереси та альтернативні інтеграційні проекти держав Центральної Європи в межах ЄС у сучасний період. *Науково-теоретичний альманах «Грані»*. 2021. № 24. С. 146.

and the “Intermarium” idea, a plan to unite the nations living between Russia and Germany. In both concepts, Ukraine played a crucial role.

Already in 1920, J. Pilsudski abandoned his concept of a federative Central and Eastern Europe by signing the Riga Agreement, which led to the division of Belarus and Ukraine between Poland and the Soviet Union. After that, the idea of creating a bloc of third forces between Western Europe and Russia, known as the “Intermarium”, emerged following the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire according to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. However, the Warsaw Treaty of May 1922, which was the last serious effort by Polish diplomacy to create the “Intermarium”, was never ratified².

After J. Pilsudski's death in 1935, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck continued to develop the “Intermarium” plans by proposing the creation of the “Third Europe” in the late 1930s, a union between Poland, Romania, and Hungary. The initial stage of forming the bloc involved establishing a common border between Poland and Hungary through Carpathian Ukraine and improving relations between Poland and Romania. However, Germany categorically rejected the idea of creating the bloc and Italy, which was not interested, did not help in lobbying for the “Third Europe” project in Berlin. Hungary and Yugoslavia were completely dependent on Germany's economy and were unable to make political decisions contrary to their interests. Unfortunately, the only achievement was the conclusion of the Polish-Romanian alliance. Therefore, for Poland to realize the “Intermarium” concept, it needed to have reliable military and economic potential³.

During the interwar period, the camps of Pilsudski and Endeks played the role of antagonists in many important issues, including the future of “Intermarium” and Ukraine within it. However, Adam Doboszynski, a representative of the young Endeks, expressed the idea of creating a “great” nation in the early 1940s, which would include the French, English, Germans, and Russians. He advocated statism and supported the idea of internal imperial tolerance between ethnic groups, which would reduce the differences between Poles and Ukrainians. This vision seemed promising as a theoretical basis for uniting Poles and Ukrainians on the platform of “Intermarium”⁴.

After World War II, the question of the necessity of uniting the nations of Europe into a single entity became particularly relevant. This was necessary to organize intergovernmental relations in a way that would ensure stability and security in the region and to overcome the crisis caused by two world wars as quickly and efficiently as possible.

² Морозова О. Ідея Міжмор'я та її реалізація в середовищі паризької «Культури». *Ольвійський форум – 2022: стратегії країн Причорноморського регіону в геополітичному просторі*: XVI Міжнар. наук. конф. 21 червня 2022 р., м. Миколаїв: програма та тези. Чорном. нац. ун-т ім. Петра Могили. 2022. С. 6-7.

³ Бойко Т., Галайко Б., Сиротюк Ю. Місія України та національні інтереси в глобалізованому світі: візія націоналістів. *П'яті Бандерівські читання: збірник матеріалів* (9 лютого 2018 р., м. Київ). Київ-Львів: Недержавний аналітичний центр «УССД» – Вид. «Астролябія», 2018. С. 313.

⁴ Афанасьєв І.Ю. Україна в польських концепціях «Міжмор'я»: 1921-1946 рр. Україна в польських концепціях Міжмор'я: 1921-1946 рр. *Україна в системі змін парадигми світопорядку XX-XXI століть*: тези Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, 19 березня 2015 р. С. 58.

Already during the interwar period, A. Briand and R. Coudenhove-Kalergi and others expressed the first thoughts on the integration of Europe into a common union⁵.

After World War II, like many other countries in Eastern Europe, Poland found itself under Soviet occupation. Some politicians, such as General V. Sikorski, continued to support the idea of “Intermarium” as a prospective plan for the future. The government in exile, led by V. Sikorski, held negotiations with Greek, Yugoslavian, and Czechoslovak colleagues during World War II, discussing aspects of the post-war order.

After the end of World War II, the main task became limiting the influence of the Soviet Union on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The United States was actively involved in implementing this plan. The National Security Council of the United States was established in 1947 and in March 1948, it made a decision to coordinate a campaign supporting resistance movements in the countries of the region.

The continuity of existence of organizations and personal inheritance was initiated by the anti-Soviet movement during World War II, prolonged by anti-communists during the Cold War, and now is preserved in the minds of American conservatives, playing an important role in modern efforts to revive “Intermarium”. One of the well-known projects is the creation of a “New Europe” with Poland as the leader of a group of states united by a common geopolitical space, including the idea of “Intermarium” and Poland’s missionary activity in Ukraine and Lithuania.

The uncertainty regarding the relationship between the countries and peoples residing in the geographical center of Europe is determined by economic, cultural, religious, and political characteristics. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were set apart from the European context due to their cultural and historical peculiarities. These states, which historically belonged to empires, found themselves located between major powers after the world wars and served as a watershed between the West and Eastern Europe, which was associated with Soviet Russia. With the weakening of the political center, where a created power vertical was maintained, the Eastern European countries began to seek a new support. In this situation, the only option for self-preservation for them was to combine with Western structures, which gained momentum, and the process of convergence with them started actively since the late 1980s.

However, after the start of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014 (annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine) and the sanctions imposed on it, Russia’s influence in the Eastern European region significantly diminished and was limited to historical and geographical dependence on energy resources⁶. The aggressive actions of Russia on the territory of sovereign neighboring states led the Eastern European countries to solidify their pro-American views and reorient towards Western Europe. In addition,

⁵ Ткач Б.А. Ідея об’єднаної Європи у поглядах Альтьєро Спінедлі. *«Дні науки філософського факультету – 2017» (25-26 квітня 2017 р.): матеріали доповідей та виступів*. К.: Видавничо-поліграфічний центр «Київський університет», 2017. Ч. 7. С. 37.

⁶ Михтуненко В. Ініціатива «Тримор’я» як стратегічний проект «нової» Європи. *Консенсус*. 2022. № 3. С. 85.

discredited international security agreements and the work of certain international organizations, such as the OSCE, contributed to this. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the actual inability to provide any security through these instruments.

As for Poland, the main generator of the idea of uniting Eastern Europe, after the liberal rule in the years 2007–2015, the parliamentary majority and the presidency were won by the national-conservative “Law and Justice” party. This party demanded the strengthening of Poland’s position in the EU and relations with other countries while maintaining close ties with the United States. It was during this time that thinking in terms of political realism, spheres of influence, and geopolitical power was revived. However, compared to the period of 2005–2007, “Law and Justice” abandoned attempts to confront Russia and create a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Particularly after 2014, it seemed that the Polish authorities had accepted that Russia remained the dominant force in the post-Soviet space. The politicians of “Law and Justice” expressed the opinion that in the current format of the EU, which is dominated by Germany, it harms the interests of other members.

Overall, the concept of “Intermarium” was revived by Andrzej Duda, who came to power in Poland in 2015. For the first time in many years, a high-ranking politician directly referred to the concept of “Intermarium”, stating that the turbulent situation in the world and within the EU compels the countries of Eastern Europe, which have a common historical experience, economic and cultural ties, to closely cooperate. Andrzej Duda believed that the cooperation of Eastern European countries is necessary for them to effectively pursue their interests within the EU. Some countries are re-establishing zones of influence or forming regional coalitions (such as Scandinavia and the Benelux), or completely withdrawing from integration processes (United Kingdom). This means that national and regional interests begin to outweigh pan-European interests. The institutionalization of the “Intermarium” concept would correspond to this logic. It would allow for the realization of the conservatives’ thesis on the necessity of building a “New Europe” instead of a supranational superstate. Strengthening cooperation among countries close to each other would be the means to achieve this goal.

In reality, the modern concept of “Intermarium” is almost entirely oriented towards the East. As a result of the hostilities in Ukraine, it becomes clear that geopolitical cooperation with the majority of the former Soviet countries (and even Belarus, in the event of a political change) is necessary. In such a situation, the southern vector of the concept, which is now called “Three Seas” due to the participation of countries located near the Adriatic Sea, is actively developing⁷.

The first step towards actualizing the “Three Seas” concept was taken in 2015 through the initiative of the presidents of Poland, Andrzej Duda, and Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. In 2016, the first summit of twelve states took place in Dubrovnik with the aim of creating the “Three Seas Initiative”. The leadership of EU member states from

⁷ Stępniewski T. Inicjatywa Trójmorza: uwarunkowania geopolityczne i nowy model regionalnej współpracy. *Studia Europejskie*. 2018. № 2. S. 33–43.

Estonia to Croatia and Bulgaria was invited to participate in the summit. Only Austria from the “old” EU member states was invited. Officially, the “Three Seas” is an economic and infrastructure projects⁸.

Projects planned within the framework of the “Three Seas Initiative” are of large scale (Poland–Croatia gas pipeline, Lithuania–Greece highway) and their implementation will take several years. However, the assessment of project success will only be possible after their completion. The concept of the “Three Seas Initiative” primarily focuses on economic and infrastructure goals. Their achievement and success depend on the political will of individual participating countries as well as external factors. The countries involved in the “Three Seas Initiative” are to varying degrees dependent on external forces (the European Union, NATO, and the United States), which requires them to play certain roles but also provides broad opportunities to exercise sovereign rights, particularly in the field of foreign policy.

During the initial summits of the participating countries, ways to achieve the set goals were outlined, including⁹:

- 1) economic growth of the region’s GDP through increased activity in the service sector and trade, both within the Eastern European region and in relations with neighboring countries (which opens up significant prospects for Ukraine);
- 2) increased interest from foreign investors;
- 3) establishment of a comprehensive energy security system;
- 4) implementation of geopolitical strategies through strengthening the unity of the “Three Seas Initiative” countries;
- 5) implementation of modern advancements in digital technologies through targeted investment, significant improvement in information exchange and utilization;
- 6) development of projects addressing climate change by reducing carbon emissions through the development of modern energy infrastructure.

Among the external actors of international relations, the United States is primarily interested in this concept as the integration of the Eastern European region and the creation of a unified collective security system there are key objectives for their policy of restraining Russia. Considering the above, Germany, which historically designed its own geopolitical structure for this territory, may oppose the integration of Eastern European countries. Discrepancies between Germany and Poland regarding the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, climate neutrality, EU institutional reform, and the role of the United States in Europe may affect Germany’s policy toward the “Three Seas Initiative”.

To sum up, it is worth noting that the development of the geopolitical strategy of the “Three Seas Initiative” directly depends on the conformity of the concept to the geopolitical

⁸ Загребельний І. Міжмор’я: (майже) втрачений шанс. Київ: ФОП Халіков, 2019. С. 202.

⁹ Ковбатьок М.В., Ковбатьок Г.О. Ініціатива Трьох Морів як ефективний шлях розвитку міжнародного економічного співробітництва. *Транспорт та логістика: сучасні виклики та перспективи розвитку*: матеріали Міжн. наук-практ. конф., м. Одеса, 18 листопада 2021 р. Одеса: ДУ ІРЕЕД НАН України, 2021. С. 121.

plans of the participating countries. After implementing the initiatives within the project, the countries involved in the “Three Seas Initiative” should achieve a high level of regional cooperation, intensify cooperation with partner countries and the European Union as a whole, thereby ensuring systematic deepening of European integration.

The successful implementation of the “Three Seas Initiative” may be influenced by Poland’s gradual alienation from the European Union. This fact motivates the current Polish government to create alternative projects, but it may also push other EU members away from them. The further course of events will also be determined by the internal political dynamics of the project participants. Changes in ruling parties in individual countries can significantly impact their foreign policy priorities. For example, the victory of liberal parties in Poland would bring about a “softening” of positions towards the European Union and attempts to enhance cooperation with the “core of old Europe”, namely Germany and France. Therefore, any fluctuations in the political situation can lead to a decline in interest in the regional cooperation format represented by the “Three Seas Initiative”.

However, Russia’s openly expansionist policy and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine convince us that the countries of Eastern Europe will only intensify the process of creating a regional security system by involving Ukraine in it. Confirmation of this thesis can be seen in Ukraine being granted partner-participant status in the “Intermarium” initiative in June 2022.

Conclusions. Ukraine’s approximation to “Intermarium” has several advantages for integration. Firstly, it provides another channel of cooperation through projects with its eastern neighbor, which aspires to join the EU. Ukraine is part of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, which includes the Odessa region, and more platforms like this are needed. Secondly, Kyiv would bring invaluable “deep knowledge” about the region, its complexities, and risks that few possess. Thirdly, it would give “Intermarium” a stronger Black Sea character, which some participating countries (such as Romania) would likely welcome. Finally, it is strange to discuss energy projects and security, which are among the priority investment areas, without the involvement of Kyiv. The political context makes Ukraine a likely supporter of the Common Energy Policy rather than separate initiatives that contradict it, thus becoming a factor of discipline and convergence within the Union.

Therefore, summarizing all the aforementioned, we can conclude that any project of uniting Eastern Europe requires years of painstaking diplomatic and economic work on multiple fronts by several countries simultaneously. If the political elites of the main potential participant countries can reach an agreement and carry out this work with the perspective of creating the project, it can become one of the most promising projects of the 21st century, revitalizing and strengthening a united Europe. However, it requires bold and unconventional steps from many countries. If the political elites of Eastern European countries are not ready for such work, each country will have to seek integration and build a security space around itself using old mechanisms that have persisted since the time of the bipolar system of international relations. Nevertheless, the emergence of such an

initiative already indicates a certain structuring of the political space in Central and Eastern Europe.

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THE OSLO AGREEMENTS AND THE 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT: THE ATTEMPT OF US PRESIDENT B. CLINTON AND HIS ADMINISTRATION TO SETTLE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT PEACEFULLY IN 1993–2001

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Abstract

The article analyzes the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements, the 2000 summit in Camp David as attempts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict with the direct participation of U.S. President Bill Clinton and his administration in 1993–2001. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of the content of the agreements and the positions of the parties regarding the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The main structural elements of the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements have been identified. The opinions of the leaders of Israel and Palestine regarding the possibility of a complete settlement of the conflict are analyzed. US President Bill Clinton's views on the process of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Camp David summit are provided. The principled positions of the leader of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat regarding Jerusalem and the creation of an independent Palestine are highlighted.

The purpose of the research is to analyze the Oslo 1, Oslo 2 agreements and the 2000 Camp David summit as an attempt by U.S. President B. Clinton and his administration to implement the process of peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The methodological basis of the research was the principles of objectivity, historicism and systematicity with the use of general scientific research methods: analysis, synthesis, generalization of information.

The scientific novelty of the publication consists in a comprehensive analysis of the peace talks Oslo 1, Oslo 2 and the summit in Camp David in 2000, as the attempts of U.S. President B. Clinton and his administration at the negotiating table to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1993–2001.

Conclusions. The agreements Oslo 1, Oslo 2 and the summit in Camp David in 2000 became a real breakthrough in relations between Israel and Palestine, for the first time in the last decades of the 20th century there were real reasons to believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict would still be possible resolve peacefully. However, despite all attempts, the Oslo-1, Oslo-2 and the 2000 Camp David summit did not finally resolve the conflict in the Middle East. In the societies of both states, new radical options for resolving the conflict were maturing, which eventually led to a new intifada of the Palestinian people.

Keywords: Arab-Israeli conflict, Middle East, B. Clinton, peace process, Oslo 1, Oslo 2, Camp David

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**УГОДИ ОСЛО ТА САМІТ У КЕМП-ДЕВІДІ 2000 Р.: СПРОБА ПРЕЗИДЕНТА США
Б. КЛІНТОНА ТА ЙОГО АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ МИРНО ВРЕГУЛЮВАТИ АРАБО-ІЗРАЇЛЬСЬКИЙ
КОНФЛІКТ У 1993-2001 РР.**

Світлана Моцак*

Ігор Токаренко**

Анотація

У статті проаналізовано угоди «Осло-1» та «Осло-2», саміт 2000 року у Кемп-Девіді, як спроби врегулювання арабо-ізраїльського конфлікту за безпосередньої участі президента США Білла Клінтона та його адміністрації. Значну увагу приділено аналізу змісту угод та позиції сторін щодо мирного врегулювання арабо-ізраїльського конфлікту. Визначено основні структурні елементи угод «Осло-1» та «Осло-2». Проаналізовано думки лідерів Ізраїлю та Палестини щодо можливості повного врегулювання конфлікту, а також думки президента США Білла Клінтона щодо процесу врегулювання арабо-ізраїльського конфлікту після саміту у Кемп-Девіді.

Метою дослідження є аналіз угод «Осло-1», «Осло-2» та саміту у Кемп-Девіді 2000 року як спроби президента США Б. Клінтона та його адміністрації здійснення процесу мирного врегулювання арабо-ізраїльського конфлікту.

Методологічною основою дослідження стали принципи об'єктивності, історизму та системності із застосуванням загальнонаукових методів дослідження: аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення інформації.

Наукова новизна публікації полягає у комплексному аналізі мирних перемовин «Осло-1», «Осло-2» та саміту у Кемп-Девіді 2000 року, як спроби президента США Б. Клінтона та його адміністрації за столом перемовин врегулювати арабо-ізраїльський конфлікт у 1993-2001 рр.

Висновки. Угоди «Осло-1», «Осло-2» та саміт у Кемп-Девіді 2000 р. стали справжнім проривом у відносинах між Ізраїлем та Палестиною. Вперше за останні десятиліття ХХ ст. були реальні підстави вважати, що арабо-ізраїльський конфлікт все ж можна буде вирішити мирним шляхом. Проте, попри всі спроби, угоди «Осло-1», «Осло-2» та саміт у Кемп-Девіді 2000 р. остаточно не вирішили конфлікт на Близькому Сході. У суспільствах обох держав визрівали нові радикальні варіанти його вирішення, що врешті-решт привело до нової інтифади палестинського народу.

Ключові слова: арабо-ізраїльський конфлікт, Близький Схід, Б. Клінтон, мирний процес, «Осло-1», «Осло-2», Кемп-Девід

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URL: <https://konsensus.net.ua/index.php/konsensus/article/view/75>

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The Problem Statement. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the main problems of the Middle East region at the present stage of its development. After the proclamation of the independent State of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians have been constantly striving to achieve justice and create their own independent state. Because of this, the conflict has taken on radical forms and it has become almost impossible to resolve it without peaceful negotiations.

After the Madrid Conference in 1991, favorable conditions were formed for attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict at the negotiating table. The United States of America, as a superpower, representing its interests in the Middle East, sought to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which prevented it from fully realizing its interests in the region. Therefore, U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton sought to bring the parties to the conflict closer to a peaceful resolution.

Historiography of the problem. A significant number of foreign scholars have studied the peace process of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict of the 1990s. In particular, the place of the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements in the system of the peace process of the Arab-Israeli conflict was studied by A. Schlime¹, G. Usher², and W. Laqueur³. The results of the Camp David Summit are analyzed in the works of A. Hanieh⁴, J. Raymond⁵, G. Usher⁶.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the Oslo 1, Oslo 2 and Camp David summit of 2000 as an attempt by US President Clinton and his administration to implement a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The main text of the article. After the escalation of the situation in the Middle East in 1987, the tension between the Arab states and Israel increased significantly. On December 9, 1987, the intifada (from the Arabic – uprising) began, which marked a new stage of the Arab-Israeli confrontation. According to the organization “B’Tselem” (Israeli non-governmental human rights organization), during 1987–1993, 111 Israelis and more than 2000 Palestinians were killed in the intifada⁷. In this context, the issue of continuing the peace process has become an important factor in reducing the tensions in the Middle East.

To this aim, with the direct mediation of the United States, negotiations began between Israel, namely Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter – PLO) with the participation of its leader Yasser Arafat, to end

¹ Avi Shlaim. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process. *International Relations of the Middle East* / Fawcett L. 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 242 p.

² Graham Usher. Dispatches from Palestine: the rise and fall of the Oslo peace process. London: Pluto Press, 1999. 197 p.

³ Laqueur W., Rubin B. The Israel-Arab reader: a documentary history of the Middle East conflict. New York: Penguin Books, 2008, 627 p.

⁴ Akram Hanieh. The Camp David Papers. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 75–97.

⁵ Raymond G. Helmick Negotiating outside the law: why Camp David failed London: Pluto Press, 2004. 352 p.

⁶ Graham Usher. Dispatches from Palestine...

⁷ Fatalities in the first Intifada. URL: https://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables

the confrontation between Arabs and Israelis. The international secret platform for negotiations between Israel and the PLO was the city of Oslo, the capital of Norway.

As a result of the first stage of negotiations, on August 20, 1993, a preliminary agreement entitled “Declaration of Principles of Peace” was concluded. Which showed that the peace process is no longer illusory and it can be not only at the level of rhetoric, but acquire legal norms.

At the second stage of negotiations, which was actually the main one, on January 26, 1993, Israel recognized the Palestinian Authority, which included Jericho and the Gaza Strip⁸.

As a result of the third stage of negotiations, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization confirmed the right to existence of the state of Israel. September 9, 1993, Y. Arafat sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Y. Rabin, in which Israel was recognized as an independent state, and also emphasized the observance of previous agreements on the settlement of the conflict.

And the last, fourth stage of negotiations was the solemn signing on September 13, 1993 in Washington of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”, better known as the “Oslo Agreements”. For the first time in decades of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the Prime Minister of Israel and the leader of the PLO shook hands. The declaration consisted of 17 articles and 4 annexes.

The goal of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the framework of the Middle East peace process was to establish an interim Palestinian Authority – an elected Council in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years. This body was supposed to enable the settlement of the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973. It is understood that these temporary measures were an organic part of the entire peace process and further full settlement of the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338⁹.

Having analyzed the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”, we can conclude that the most important points of this declaration are:

- the official recognition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which will be governed by an elected PLO Council;
- the formation of a transitional period and negotiations on permanent status. The transitional period was to be five years after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and permanent status negotiations were to begin as soon as possible, but no later than the third year of the transitional period;
- formation of a joint force to maintain public order and security. The PLO Council would establish a police force, while Israel would continue to be responsible for defense

⁸ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords). URL: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93>

⁹ Ibidem.

against external threats and the responsibility for the common security of Israelis for their internal security and public order¹⁰.

In general, the “Oslo Accords” or as they are also called the Oslo 1 agreements have become an important factor in the resumption of the peace process of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The overall result of these agreements was the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel, as well as the end of the intifada.

The next stage of negotiations was the approval of the permanent status of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. To this end, before the conclusion of the Oslo 2 agreement, two more important agreements were signed, “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement)” of May 4, 1994 and “Agreement on the preparation of the transfer of powers and responsibilities” of August 29, 1994¹¹.

The “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement)” provided for the withdrawal of Israeli units from the territory of the Gaza Strip and Jericho, as well as the transfer of power in these regions from the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinian National Authority.

The “Agreement on Preparation for the Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities” became an important element in the implementation of the “Declaration of Principles on Provisional Measures for Self-Government” of September 13, 1993. According to this agreement, the Palestinian National Authority took over education, culture, social security, tourism, health care and taxation in the territory under its jurisdiction. This agreement was finally implemented on December 1, 1994¹².

To continue the implementation of the Oslo Accords, on September 28, 1995, the next stage of peace talks between the PLO and Israel took place in Washington, DC. As a result, the Interim Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza was signed. This agreement was called Oslo 2 (Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). The agreement consisted of 5 chapters and 31 articles.

After analyzing the content of the Oslo 2 Accords, it can be concluded that the most important achievements of this agreement were:

- transfer of authority from Israel to the PLO;
- determination of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which shall be maintained during the transition period;
- approval of the procedure and principles of elections to the Palestinian governing bodies;
- consolidation of provisions on the executive body and its powers¹³.

However, in September 1996, the confrontation between Israel and Palestine gained new momentum. Palestine insisted on a partial redeployment of Israeli troops from

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Avi Shlaim. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process... P. 78.

¹² Ibid. P. 80.

¹³ Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II). URL: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloII95>

Hebron. However, thanks to the actions of B. Clinton and M. Albright, B. Netanyahu still partially fulfilled the conditions of the Palestinians¹⁴.

Thus, the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements became an important factor in the continuation of the peace process of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict after the beginning of the Intifada in 1987. The Oslo 1 Agreement was a breakthrough in the relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, as they recognized each other and Palestine gained autonomy. In turn, the Oslo 2 Agreement consolidated the provisions of the previous agreement, and approved the procedure and principles of the Palestinian government and elections.

Although the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements haven't had an absolute success that would have led to a complete settlement of the conflict, they served as a factor in the further settlement of the Arab-Israeli confrontation on other international platforms in the following years.

In this context, an important initiative was the Camp David Summit, which was supposed to consolidate the provisions of the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements and fully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The summit was initiated by U.S. President Bill Clinton, for whom the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a top foreign policy priority.

The summit was scheduled for July 11, 2000, at the US President's country residence, Camp David, near the town of Thurmont in Maryland.

Before the summit, Israeli Prime Minister E. Barak addressed the Israeli people with a speech in which he emphasized: "The moment of truth is near and I am ready for it. One hundred years of hostility and struggle meet at this moment in time. We have lost too much, and both sides have suffered because of the unbearably high price of not only defeat but also victory. The time has come to end the conflict and allow our children to thrive in peace¹⁵."

This demonstrated Israel's readiness to resolve the conflict peacefully. In his speech before the summit, E. Barak outlined the principles that the future agreement should contain:

- United Jerusalem must remain under Israeli sovereignty;
- the borders of 1967 should be revised;
- the vast majority of settlers in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will live in settlement blocs under Israeli rule;
- absence of foreign military formations in the entire territory west of the Jordan River;
- solving the refugee problem outside the sovereign territory of Israel¹⁶.

E. Barak, together with the Israeli government, was ready for compromises, but only those that would not contradict Israel's state security.

¹⁴ Graham Usher. *Dispatches from Palestine...* P. 113

¹⁵ Laqueur W., Rubin B. *The Israel-Arab reader...* P. 549.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 550.

In turn, the Palestinian side was critical of the upcoming negotiations, even seeing them as a possible trap.

Close to the leader of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, A. Haniyeh, editor-in-chief of the Palestinian daily “Al-Ayyam” and one of the main political advisers to the PLO Chairman, on the eve of the summit published a quote from Yasser Arafat’s talks with US Secretary of State M. Albright in June 2000: “Madam Secretary, if you send an invitation to the summit and it is held and fails, it will weaken the hope among the [Palestinian] people in the possibility of achieving peace¹⁷”. July 4, 2000, Y. Arafat received a phone call from B. Clinton, in which the US President explained the need for a summit without preparatory talks. Y. Arafat three times tried to explain to B. Clinton his concern about the expected consequences of the Summit, but B. Clinton, based on the recommendations of M. Albright and other White House advisers, insisted on the Summit¹⁸.

Before the summit, the PLO Council formed a Palestinian consensus on what they consider a fair solution to the conflict with Israel and determined its position before the start of negotiations. This position contained the following items:

The right to return “or adequate compensation” for Palestinian refugees, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194;

- Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

- removal of Israeli settlements from the entire occupied Palestinian territory;

- formation of East Jerusalem as the future capital of an independent Palestinian state¹⁹.

That is, the positions of the parties on the eve of the summit were radically different. These differences immediately called into question the rationality of holding the summit these days, however, the Camp David was held anyway.

The negotiations were based on an all-or-nothing approach. No requirements were considered binding and agreed upon until the results were ratified by the parties. The negotiation process itself was mostly oral. The final text of the agreements was not reached.

During the negotiations, it became known that Israel:

- refused to assume any responsibility for the refugee problem, but proposed to create an international fund to compensate both Palestinians and Jewish immigrants to Israel;

- airspace was to remain under Israeli control;

- the Palestinian Authority had to be strictly demilitarized, and Israel had to maintain full control over all borders;

- according to E. Barak’s proposal, in Jerusalem, the Palestinians would be left with a large number of pieces of land in the outer suburbs, while “Greater Jerusalem” would be under Israeli control;

¹⁷ Raymond G. Helmick Negotiating outside the law... P. 128–129.

¹⁸ Ibid. P. 129.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

- the Old City with its holy sites was to be under Israeli sovereignty, and the Palestinians were to be granted local safe passage to the mosque and the temple mountain of Al-Haram Al-Sharif²⁰.

In view of this, the proposal was unacceptable to the Palestinian side in the form in which it was formulated by the Israeli delegation.

Analyzing the results of the summit, it can be concluded that Y. Arafat sought to create an independent Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem, and he was almost not interested in E. Barak's "land for peace" proposal. Since the ideological position was not subject to discussion, since Jerusalem is one of the most important shrines for Palestinians.

The result of the Camp David Summit of July 25, 2000, was a trilateral statement on the peace process in the Middle East:

The Camp David Summit of July 25, 2000, resulted in a trilateral statement on the peace process in the Middle East:

Between July 11 and July 24, 2000, under the auspices of US President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat met at Camp David to reach a permanent status agreement. Although they were unable to overcome disputes and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail. Building on the progress made at Camp David, the two leaders agreed on principles to guide the negotiations:

1) Both sides agree that the goal of their negotiations is to end the century-long conflict with a just and, above all, lasting peace.

2) Both sides commit to continue their efforts to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.

3) Both sides agree that negotiations on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to reach such an agreement, and they commit to creating an environment for negotiations free from pressure, intimidation and threats.

4) Both sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that are contrary to the outcome of the negotiations and that their differences will be resolved only through peaceful negotiations.

5) Both sides agree that the United States remains a vital partner in the search for peace and will continue to consult closely with President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright in the period ahead²¹.

After the summit, U.S. President B. Clinton gave a closing speech: "After 14 days of intense negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, we regret to say that the parties will not be able to reach an agreement at this time... At the end of this summit, I fully recognize the deep disappointment felt by both sides. But it was important for the Israelis and Palestinians to finally start making the most difficult decisions in the peaceful

²⁰ Akram Hanieh. The Camp David Papers. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), Berkeley: University of California Press, P. 81-84.

²¹ Mideast peace process/Camp David Summit (July 2000) – Trilateral statement/Non-UN document. URL: <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-193931/>

settlement of the conflict. Only they can make these decisions, and they have both committed to make them...”²².

The failure of the Camp David peace talks was one of the reasons for the radicalization of Palestinian public sentiment, which, combined with other internal factors, led to the continuation of the 1987 intifada, which was called the Al-Aqsa Intifada and began on September 27, 2000.

Conclusions. The Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 Accords became an important factor in the continuation of the peace process to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict after the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987. The Oslo 1 Agreement was a breakthrough in the relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, as they recognized each other and Palestine gained autonomy. In turn, the Oslo 2 Agreement enshrined the provisions of the previous agreement and approved the procedure and principles of the Palestinian authorities. At the same time, the Camp David summit in 2000 aimed to finally resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by approving the previous agreements and resolving the most painful territorial problems of Israelis and Palestinians. All of these negotiations were initiated and mediated by the United States, led by President Bill Clinton, who sought to fully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by the end of his second term.

Despite all attempts, the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements and the Camp David summit of 2000 did not finally resolve the conflict in the Middle East. New radical options for resolving the conflict were emerging in the societies of both states, which eventually led to a new intifada of the Palestinian people.

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²² Laqueur W., Rubin B. The Israel-Arab reader... P. 551.

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**PARTICIPATION OF THE PRC IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN
KAZAKHSTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE CENTRAL ASIA IN
1990–2016: FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC FACTORS**

Yulia Podriez*

Abstract

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military– political and economic situation in the world had changed radically. The Berlin Wall fell ,The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) stopped its existence, the socialist bloc of countries in Europe and the USSR collapsed. The world was no more bipolar. The PRC, led by the CCP, despite the ruling Communist Party ideology, strived to take advantage of these changes. China aimed to open for itself foreign markets, including energy resources. PRC's rejection from complete isolationism, the initial cessation of confrontation with the United States and countries of the West, and then cessation of the struggle with the USSR and its allies for leadership in building a world socialist system, allowed Chinese government not only to save huge resources, including energy, which went to maintenance of a huge army and ambitious military–political projects, by directing them in a peaceful direction, but also by starting the introduction of market reforms, what changed China's image in the world from a negative to a positive one.

Since the formation on the territory of the former Soviet Central Asia of the independent states of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan – hydrocarbon resources of the region acquired key importance in the foreign policy of the new countries.

China formed the priorities of its foreign energy policy in relation to Central Asia gradually. Energy expansion of Beijing was preceded by an active trade and economic policy, the results of which created preconditions for the foreign policy refocusing of the countries of the region.

Pipelines became an important element of energy policy, proposed and implemented by Beijing for the supply of hydrocarbon resources in Chinese direction. Beijing achieves access to new oil and gas deposits, expecting due to their development, to realize promising plans to increase the exports volume of hydrocarbon raw materials from Central Asia countries.

Keywords: China, Central Asia, energy sphere, oil and gas companies, investments

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УЧАСТЬ КНР У РОЗВИТКУ НАФТОГАЗОВОЇ ГАЛУЗІ КАЗАХСТАНУ, ТУРКМЕНИСТАНУ ТА ІНШИХ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ АЗІЇ 1990–2016 РР.: ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНІ ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНІ ФАКТОРИ

Юлія Подрез*

Анотація

У кінці 1980-х на – початку 1990-х військово-політична й економічна ситуація в світі кардинально змінилася. Берлінська стіна впала, Організація Варшавського Договору (ОВД) припинила існування, соціалістичний блок країн у Європі та СРСР розпалися. Світ більше не був біполярним. КНР на чолі з КПК, не дивлячись на пануючу комуністичну ідеологію, прагнула скористатися цими змінами. КНР воліла відкрити для себе зовнішні ринки, у тому числі енергоресурсів. Відмова КНР від суцільного ізоляціонізму, припинення спочатку протистояння із США та країнами Заходу, а потім боротьби з СРСР та його союзниками за лідерство в побудові світової соціалістичної системи дозволи китайському уряду не тільки зекономити величезні ресурси, в тому числі енергетичні, що йшли на утримання гігантської армії та амбітні військово-політичні проекти, направивши їх у мирне русло, а й, розпочавши запровадження ринкових реформ, змінити в світі імідж Китаю з негативного на позитивний.

З моменту утворення на території колишньої радянської Середньої Азії незалежних держав Центральної Азії – Казахстану, Киргизстану, Узбекистану, Таджикистану, Туркменістану – вуглеводневі ресурси регіону придбали ключове значення у зовнішній політиці нових країн.

Китай формував пріоритети зовнішньої енергетичної політики по відношенню до Центральної Азії поступово. Енергетичній експансії Пекіна передувала активна торгово-економічна політика, результати якої створювали передумови для зовнішньополітичної переорієнтації країн регіону.

Важливим елементом енергетичної політики стали трубопроводи, запропоновані й реалізовані Пекіном для поставок вуглеводневих ресурсів в китайському напрямку. Пекін домагається доступу до нових нафтогазових родовищ, розраховуючи за рахунок їх розробки реалізувати перспективні плани по збільшенню обсягів експорту вуглеводневої сировини з країн Центральної Азії.

Ключові слова: Китай, Центральна Азія, енергетична сфера, нафтогазові компанії, інвестиції

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Formulation of the problem. People's Republic of China today continues to be the world leader in electricity production and consumption, its part is almost 25% of the total world generation. China is the world's largest consumer of carbohydrates- oil, coal, gas. The Chinese energy market is the most capacious. More than 30 countries of the world export hydrocarbons and other sources of energy to China. Consumption index of oil and its reserves in China is one of the key factors that affects world oil prices fluctuations.

At the same time, China invests in development of renewable energy more than any other country in the world – more than 50% of the global total capital investments. Atomic energy is also actively developing. Simultaneously building more than 10 nuclear power units in the country, China has already reached the world market of atomic energy with its own NPP projects. That is why studying the foreign policy aspects of the PRC's energy strategy is extremely important for understanding and forecasting the international development trends, relations and the world economy, including relevant issues of Chinese-Ukrainian relations. In this context, the author's goal is to investigate China's participation and role in the development of the oil and gas industry in Central Asian countries.

Literature Review. In the works of L. Leshchenko, attention is focused on the domestic and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the early 2000s, the causes, consequences and prospects of the economic “Chinese miracle”, the phenomenal progress of the ASEAN countries, the influence of the civilization factor on the development and integration of the countries of Southeast As¹.

In the work of M. Grimska, a comparative analysis of the means and methods of optimizing the foreign policy of the PRC in the context of global and regional challenges to national security at the stage of the implementation of the “four modernizations” strategy² was carried out. It was found that the foreign policy of the PRC in the 2000s was aimed at to ensure conditions for the implementation of the national development strategy, the goal of which is China's achievement of the status of a superpower by the middle of the 21st century, which would occupy a dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region and equal in political influence, economic and military power to the USA.

A. Volkov's work is devoted to the rivalry between the Russian Federation, the United States, and the People's Republic of China for the control of Central Asian resources, the problems of economic cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and the clash of interests of the respective oil and gas companies of the world³.

¹ Лещенко Л.О. Внутрішня і зовнішня політика КНР в контексті глобалізаційних процесів. *Дослідження світової політики*. 2000. Вип. 14. С. 72–82; Лещенко Л.О. Китайсько-американське суперництво за світові ресурси сировини і палива. *Пріоритети розвитку країн Азії і Африки: глобальні імперативи, периферійна специфіка*: матеріали Міжвід. наук.-теорет. конф., 24 черв. 2008 р. Київ, 2008. 137 с.

² Гримська М.І. КНР і США: глобальне партнерство чи боротьба за домінування? *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин. Зб. наук. праць*. Київ, 2007. Вип. 68 (Частина 1). С. 127–135.

³ Волков В. Китай–Туркменія: ставка більше, ніж газ. URL: <http://www.dw.com/-17638565>

Professor Guan Pan, who at the time of publication of the article was the director of the Center for International Studies at the Institute of Europe and Asia of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the head of the Shanghai Research Center of the SCO, in his work justified the need for China's participation in ensuring the energy-rich region of Central Asia⁴.

R. Izimov insisted in his research that Central Asia is of strategic interest for the energy market of the People's Republic of China. In his article, he noted that "in the future, China will only increase comprehensive cooperation with the republics of the Central Asian region in order to obtain the largest possible volumes of oil and gas with the parallel implementation of infrastructure and transport projects in this region" and "...competition between Chinese, Western and Russian companies present in Kazakhstan will increase"⁵.

Gal Luft's article Strategic Implications of Chinese Energy Policy, published in The American Interest magazine on February 3, 2015, widely known among international political scientists, historians, journalists, and diplomats, aroused great interest among researchers of China's foreign and domestic policy. Gela Luft, one of the directors of the Institute for Global Security Analysis and a senior adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, believes that "the more ramified China's failed energy acquisition strategy becomes, the more dangerous Chinese geopolitics in the near abroad becomes"⁶. "The People's Republic of China is critically dependent on external sources of energy and accordingly will do everything possible to create conditions for the best security of sources and routes," G. Luft is convinced, who sees this as a potential challenge for the USA.

Presentation of Material. The introduction of radical reforms and market relations in China has, in fact, left the political system untouched. A minor upsurge in anti-communist opposition in China, influenced by the "perestroika" in the USSR, was even used by a part of the orthodox leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at its 13th Congress (October–November 1987) to accuse Deng Xiaoping and his supporters of "bourgeois liberalism".

As a result of a complex behind-the-scenes struggle, the "architect of reforms" managed to remove his opponents from the Central Committee of the party, and the third stage of reforms began after the congress. However, on the verge of 1988–1989, in the context of an "overheated" economy, inflation, growing corruption, and abuse by government officials in the country, the social-political situation sharply deteriorated.

In the economy, a course was taken towards "regulating the national economy" and temporarily slowing down of the reforms. Starting from April 15, 1989, due to the death of CCP Chairman Hu Yaobang, who was considered a symbol of political change, the student

⁴ Гуан Пан. Енергетична політика Китаю та забезпечення безпеки в Центральній Азії. *Центральна Азія та Кавказ*. 2007. № 6 (54). С. 98–107.

⁵ Изимов Р.Ю. Глобальна енергетична політика Китаю та місце в ній Центральної Азії. URL: <http://cc-sauran.kz/rubriki/economika/107-globalnaya-energeticheskaya-politika-kitaya.html>

⁶ Luft G. Strategic Implications of Chinese Energy Policy. *The American Interest*. 2015. Vol. 10. No. 4. URL: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/03/strategic-implications-of-chinese-energy-policy/>

opposition movement became more active. Workers dissatisfied with price reforms began to join the students in the capital⁷.

In response, the CCP leadership ordered the military to clear Tiananmen Square on the night of June 4th, where an indefinite student hunger strike and protest were taking place. As a result of its dispersal, more than 1,000 people were killed, and numerous arrests began. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, a veteran of the communist guerrilla movement, was removed from power for indecisiveness and leniency. His successor was Jiang Zemin, a representative of the next generation, from Shanghai, who became the Chairman of China from March 27, 1993⁸. Meanwhile, the 14th Congress of the CCP in October 1992 declared a course towards a transition to a “socialist market economy” and integration into the world market. While maintaining control over the state sector and dominant positions in key industries, state-owned enterprises began to become shareholding.

Measures were continually taken to further increase of non-governmental ownership part in the national economy, liberalizing foreign trade, and improving conditions for foreign investments. Special attention was given to mobilizing factors for the intensive development of the economy, such as attracting investments, accelerating scientific and technological progress, energy conservation, and others⁹.

Furthermore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military, political, and economic situation in the world underwent profound changes. The Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) ceased to exist, and the socialist bloc of countries in Europe and the USSR disintegrated. The world was no longer bipolar. China, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), despite its prevailing communist ideology, strived to take advantage of these changes¹⁰.

While in the 1960s and 1970s, China's foreign policy was dominated by political and ideological elements (amid confrontation with the USSR and the USA, China aimed to become a leading force in the “third world”), after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, economic pragmatism took precedence, which was a result of domestic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping and continued by his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

China aimed to open up to external markets, including energy resources. Despite multiple attempts to achieve even a rough trade balance between export and import in foreign trade, since the beginning of economic reforms in 1978–1979, China ended up with a trade balance deficit every three out of four years. The structure of exports underwent significant changes in the 1980s. While at the beginning of the decade, food products and mineral raw materials (such as oil and coal) accounted for 40% of China's total exports, by

⁷ Luft G. Strategic Implications of Chinese Energy Policy... C. 9–10.

⁸ Ibid. P. 9–10.

⁹ Stang G. China's energy demands: Are they reshaping the world? Pp. 99–101. URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_12_China_energy.pdf

¹⁰ Демонстраційний поїзд новим «Шовковим шляхом» успішно дістався до кінцевого пункту призначення. URL: <http://mtu.gov.ua/news/25574.html>

the end of the decade, they barely reached 20%. During this period, the share of finished products in exports increased from 50% to 75%.

The structure of imports also changed, with the share of finished products rising from 65% to 82% of the total value of import shipments¹¹. Regarding specific types of goods, by the late 1980s, the value of exports of finished clothing exceeded the combined value of oil exports, which had been China's largest export category for many years. Cotton fabrics and seafood ranked third and fourth, respectively, in terms of export value. China's major trading partners in the 1980s to the early 1990s were Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, and Germany, with Hong Kong, in its turn, was dealing with the re-export of many goods purchased in China.

China's GDP grew at an average rate of 10.2% per year in the 1980s and 1990s. From 1990 to 1997, its growth was the highest in the world at 11.9% annually, and in 1998–1999, it averaged 8–9%. Such production growth required a substantial amount of energy, and the development and balancing of the energy sector posed significant challenges for the Chinese government¹².

In 1995, the energy balance structure in China was dominated by coal (73%), followed by hydroelectric power (19%), oil (6%), and nuclear energy (1%). China had abundant coal reserves (with proven reserves of 270 billion tons) and already ranked first in the world in coal mining (1.4 billion tons in 1997)¹³. Most of the coal deposits were concentrated in northern and northeastern provinces (with Shanxi province alone accounting for about a quarter of the total coal production). Major coal mining centers included Huainan, Hegang, Kailuan, Datun, Fushun, and Fuxin. Additionally, numerous small coal deposits were scattered throughout the country, and approximately half of the coal was extracted from 11,000 small coal mines¹⁴.

As of the beginning of 1997, China's total oil reserves amounted to 94 billion tons. Large oil reserves were discovered in Northwestern China, particularly in the Gansu province, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the Qaidam Basin (Tibetan Plateau). In Northeastern China, significant oil reserves were found in the valleys of the Sungari and Liaohe rivers. Natural gas reserves, mainly concentrated in Sichuan province, were estimated at 39 trillion cubic meters by the beginning of 1997. Additionally, projects for methane extraction from coal mines were implemented in Northern China hard coal mines.

In terms of potential hydroelectric resources, China had already surpassed Far East countries in the 1990s. However, the development of hydroelectric power was constrained by a lack of capital needed for the construction of large dams. Several major hydroelectric

¹¹ Стратегия превращения Китая в супериндустриальное государство (1998–2050). *Памятники исторической мысли*. 2002. С. 110–111.

¹² Ibid. С. 123–124.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Ibid. С. 92, 130.

projects were in the planning and construction stages, including the Sanxia Hydroelectric Power Station on the Yangtze River with a projected capacity of 17.7 million kilowatts¹⁵.

The high rate of economic development led to a significant increase in energy consumption. Oil demand was growing at an average rate of 4% per year, while domestic oil production was increasing by only 1.7% annually. There was only one acceptable way out – complete cessation of own exports and, accordingly, the transition to imports. Considering the geopolitical situation, market prices, supply, and transportation factors, countries in the Middle East emerged as the most promising source, not only for buying oil but also for selling to them. This was because oil dollars were increasing the purchasing power of the Arab population-at the time¹⁶.

Attempting to establish a foothold in the Middle Eastern market, China faced the challenge that this market was already practically dominated by the United States, Japan, and Western European countries. In these circumstances, China had to explore the few available “risky” markets that were either unoccupied or uninteresting to others and offer products that no one else was offering. In 1990, China’s exports to Middle Eastern countries amounted to \$1.5 billion. At that time, around 50,000 Chinese workers and officials were employed in the region, primarily in construction. By 1994, the trade volume between China and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf had reached \$2.26 billion¹⁷.

China’s most notable and significant achievement in the Middle East was its entry into the market of Saudi Arabia, which was previously dominated by the U.S. companies. Active relations between Beijing and Riyadh began to develop in the mid-1980s when China supplied Saudi Arabia with a batch of medium-range ballistic missiles. In return for access to Saudi oil, China offered Riyadh the opportunity to operate in its rapidly growing energy market, which was soon to become the largest in the world¹⁸.

By the late 1990s, political relations between Beijing and Riyadh had strengthened. In 1998, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz of Saudi Arabia visited China. During this visit, an agreement worth \$1.5 billion was reached for the construction of a joint Chinese-Saudi oil refinery and the supply of Saudi oil to China at a volume of 10 million tons annually for the next 50 years. During China chairman Jiang Zemin’s visit to Riyadh in 1999, “strategic relations” in the field of energy- were announced between the two countries¹⁹.

In the last decade of the 20th century, economic cooperation between Iran and China also developed rapidly. Between 1990 and 1994, the trade between China and Iran increased from \$314 million to \$700 million. The agreement signed in 1995 for economic cooperation worth \$2 billion provided China for purchasing up to 60,000 barrels of oil per day, the construction of a joint oil refinery in China, power plants, and a cement factory in Iran.

¹⁵ Austin A. Energy and Power in China: Domestic Regulation and Foreign Policy. URL: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/448.pdf>

¹⁶ Breslin Sh. Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy. URL: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR012/breslin.pdf>

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Волович А. Китай на энергетическом рынке Ближнего Востока. URL: <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=3299>

¹⁹ Luft G. Strategic Implications of Chinese Energy Policy...

Chinese companies Sinopec and CNPC became actively involved in Iran. In January 2000, after prolonged negotiations, Sinopec signed a contract with the Iranian National Oil Company (NIOC) for the development of oil fields in the Zavaneh and Kashan regions. However, China faced stiff competition from Japan in Iran, and shortly after these events, Japanese Companies signed a contract with NIOC to develop oil fields in the Azadegan region²⁰.

One of the conditions for China's advancement in Iran's energy market was the sale of Chinese weapons to Tehran. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), China was practically the only one significant source of weapon for Iran.

Though close relations with Iran, it did not prevent China from building strong ties with Iraq at the same time. In the 1990s, China became one of the first countries to consume Iraqi oil under the United Nations “Oil-for-Food” program. In June 1997, CNPC signed a contract to develop the Al-Ahdab oilfield, hoping to produce up to 90,000 barrels per day²¹.

Despite its foreign policy efforts to increase energy imports from abroad, China's economy in the 1990s remained heavily reliant on coal, which accounted for nearly three-quarters of its energy balance. Therefore, in order to eliminate the losses incurred by small enterprises and maintain the pace of production growth, technical reconstruction, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and measures to improve product quality and expand the product range were implemented. In the restructuring of coal mines, the important aspects were the introduction of modern equipment and the reduction of unskilled personnel²².

The reform of state-owned mines in China was gradual. In 1992, after the adoption of PRC's Company Law, there began a phased process of corporatization of coal enterprises, expanding their economic activities. In 1995, projects to modernize the system of enterprises were initiated, with some of the most successful being the creation of the Mineral Resources Committee in Yanzhou and the development of coal mines in areas such as Xintai, Zhenzhou, Panzhihua, and Pingdingshan.

In the same year, the “Shenhua Group” was established, which by 2007 had combined 59 major coal mines with an annual production of up to 300 million tons, making it a leader in the global coal market.

Therefore, in the 1990s, PRC's development in the energy sector was influenced not only by domestic economic factors but also by external policy factors. China's shift away from isolationism, the cessation of its initial confrontation with the United States and Western countries, and later its departure from its struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies for leadership in building a global socialist system allowed the Chinese government to

²⁰ Стратегия превращения Китая в супериндустриальное государство... С. 135–137; Luft G. Strategic Implications of Chinese Energy Policy...

²¹ Лещенко Л.О. Внутрішня і зовнішня політика КНР... С. 77–79.

²² Гримська М.І. Еволюція зовнішньої політики КНР в умовах реалізації стратегії «чотирьох модернізацій»: автореф. дис... к. політ. наук: 23.00.04. Київ, 2009. С. 11–12.

redirect its considerable resources, including energy resources, away from maintaining a huge army and ambitious military-political projects towards peaceful economic development.

This, along with the initiation of market-oriented reforms, changed China's image from negative to positive on the world stage, although this transformation did not occur one year. The internal reforms of the 1980s gave not bad results in the 1990s when the world was changing after the end of the Cold War, and China, which had already begun to change internally, was ready for external changes. Partly due to RPC's declared policy of openness, it was able to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and simultaneously penetrate foreign energy resource markets.

By the beginning of 1997, the volume of foreign investments in the Chinese economy exceeded \$40 billion, and by the end of 1999, it reached nearly \$50 billion, a third of these funds were direct investments in energy projects or projects related to energy, such as transportation and infrastructure, mining equipment, deep processing of oil, coal, and timber.

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, Central Asia gradually became a priority direction in China's external energy strategy, and RCP itself became the main trading partner of the Central Asian republics in the energy sector. However, this was not always like that, and the path to this was not easy. Since the formation of independent states in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, hydrocarbon resources in the region have gained significant importance in the foreign policy of these new countries. In the 1990s, these resources began to attract increasing attention from other countries and companies. Russia, the United States, EU countries, and China were among the most active players in the region, vying for leading positions in Central Asia, especially in the energy sector²³.

American companies (ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and others) and European oil and gas companies (such as BP, Total, Eni, Shell, and others) showed great interest in the explored and potential hydrocarbon reserves. Turkmenistan, with substantial gas reserves, and Kazakhstan, with significant oil reserves²⁴, received particular attention.

Numerous international consortia that were established to develop hydrocarbon resources in the region, and Western oil and gas companies rushed to secure their positions in potentially oil and gas-rich deposits. The energy policies of Central Asian countries, which sought Western oil and gas capital, contributed to the penetration of Western oil and gas companies into the region. With its help they hoped to conduct exploration of hydrocarbon reserves and, in the long term, engage in oil and gas extraction and export to external markets. At least in the initial stages, the investments made by oil

²³ Breslin Sh. Access: China's Resource Foreign Policy. Pp. 128-129. URL: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR012/breslin.pdf>; Лещенко Л.О. Китайсько-американське суперництво за світові ресурси сировини і палива... С. 81-82.

²⁴ Гуан Пан. Енергетична політика Китаю... С. 99-105.

and gas companies played a crucial role in the development of hydrocarbon resources, enabling the region's countries to boost their economies and stabilize their internal political situations, which were quite turbulent in the early 1990s.

On the intergovernmental level, the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia became a key focus of the foreign policy of the United States and the European Union. Washington and Brussels provided political support to the countries of the region, particularly in matters related to the extraction and transportation of hydrocarbon resources. The main goal of the Western powers was to redirect the hydrocarbon flows of the Central Asian countries toward Europe, thereby reducing their dependence on Russia and diversifying the sources of energy resources for the EU²⁵.

In the context of active participation by Western oil and gas companies and governmental structures in the development of hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia and increased attention to the region from China, Russia's successes were relatively modest. Russia's most notable achievement in Central Asia was the realization of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), designed for the delivery of Kazakhstani oil to the port of Novorossiysk. Other Russian projects did not progress to the implementation stage.

The participation of Russian companies in the development of new oil and gas fields in Central Asia was also limited, and the volume of investments was insignificant. At the state level, Russia's efforts were aimed at preserving political influence in the countries of the region. Russia largely ignored the energy interests of the Central Asian countries, which ultimately led to a reduction in its influence and the loss of its position as the monopoly transit provider for hydrocarbon resources from Central Asia²⁶.

China gradually formulated its priorities in external energy policy regarding Central Asia. Beijing's energy expansion was preceded by an active trade and economic policy, the results of which created conditions for the region's countries to undergo foreign policy reorientation. China came close to taking leading positions in trading volumes with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

As the needs of the Chinese economy for hydrocarbon resources grew, China became increasingly interested in gaining access to the oil and gas resources of Central Asian countries. The Chinese side was persistent in acquiring ownership of hydrocarbon deposits as well as facilities for their processing. China achieved significant success in organizing equipment supplies, providing service services, and, more recently, in drilling operations.

In the last decade, China consistently increased its share in the energy sector of Central Asian countries. This policy reflected Beijing's geopolitical aims and the growing needs of the Chinese economy for additional hydrocarbon resources. According to various estimates, China's presence in Kazakhstan's energy sector has already exceeded 25%. China

²⁵ Ізимов Р.Ю. Глобальна енергетична політика Китаю та місце в ній Центральної Азії...

²⁶ Крутіхін М. Як Китай переграє «Роснефть» і «Газпром». URL: <http://www.vedomosti/opinion/articles/2014/09/18/poddavki-skitaem>

was able to achieve such success through a consistent foreign policy supported by significant financial resources²⁷.

At the present stage, China's energy policy in Central Asia, as before, is firmly subordinated to Beijing's overall strategy of ensuring the most favorable conditions for achieving a systemic breakthrough in terms of modernization, sustained economic growth, and further transforming the country into one of the global economic centers of power. Striving to achieve these complex challenges, China is increasingly focusing on its Central Asian policy, choosing to significantly strengthen its positions in the economies of Central Asian countries through intensified project activities, increased investments, and loans. The oil and gas sectors play a crucial role in this strategy²⁸.

According to Kazakh China experts Ruslan Izimov and Kazakh political scientist Madiya Torebayeva, there are approximately 20 oil and gas companies in Kazakhstan with Chinese ownership ranging from 50% to 100% . The largest oil companies are CNPC, SINOPEC, and CITIC. According to official statistics for the year 2012, Chinese companies ranked second in terms of oil production in Kazakhstan, accounting for 25.2% of the total oil production. American oil companies were in first place with 25.7%, and Kazakhstani companies ranked third place with 20% of oil production. European and Russian companies followed with 10% and 7%, accordingly²⁹. As we can see, despite entering the Kazakhstani market as a relatively late player, China has nearly caught up with the leader, the United States, and has significantly surpassed all others.

An important element of China's energy policy has been the pipelines proposed and implemented by Beijing for the delivery of hydrocarbon resources towards China. In 2009–2010, without involving Russian companies, oil and gas pipelines of varying capacities, such as the “Kazakhstan–China” and “Turkmenistan–China” pipelines³⁰, were constructed to ensure reliable hydrocarbon supplies to China from Central Asian countries. This should establish a reliable hydrocarbons supply to China, those countries, in turn, are counting on strengthening their positions with increased oil and gas production³¹.

Until recently, China primarily expanded its presence in Central Asian countries on old hydrocarbon deposits that had reached their peak production. However, Beijing is now seeking access to new oil and gas deposits, aiming to increase its hydrocarbon exports from Central Asian countries through their development. This includes gaining access to Kazakhstan's offshore projects. This could be facilitated by exit from some Western company projects and increased Chinese investments in deposit development.

In the region, there are gigantic deposits such as Kashagan on the Caspian Shelf of Kazakhstan, which is the world's largest offshore deposit, and South Yolotan in

²⁷ Артем'єв О. Вікно в Європу: як Китай запустив новий «Шовковий шлях» в обхід Росії. URL: <http://www.rbc/politics/15/12/2015/56703a6d9a7f88a89ae7d>

²⁸ Зуби дракона: як китайські нафтяні компанії підкорюють увесь світ. *Forbes*. URL: <http://m.forbes.ru/article.php?id=244914>

²⁹ Ізімов Р.Ю. Глобальна енергетична політика Китаю та місце в ній Центральної Азії...

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Гуан Пан. Енергетична політика Китаю та забезпечення безпеки в Центральній Азії... С. 105.

Turkmenistan, one of the three largest gas deposits on the planet. In just 2.5 years from 2010 to 2013, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) constructed the Central Asia Gas Pipeline, running from its concession in Bagtyarlyk in northern Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwestern China. Spanning a length of a pipeline is 2,200 kilometres³².

China and other interested countries are attempting to forecast the future situation. Over the next few years, developments in the energy sector in Central Asia can undergo significant changes. The beginning of industrial development of new deposits in Central Asia countries will have a key impact on the development of the region, and at the same time will force a new assessment of its prospects. It particularly refers to oil production in Kazakhstan, in particular, on Kashagan, and in Turkmenistan – about the development of promising gas fields, such as Dovletabad and Southern Iolotan-Osman. The long-term filling of already built oil and gas pipelines, as well as implementation of promising pipeline projects that expand geography of export flows from the countries of Central Asia depend on the success of new fields development. Diversifying the export of hydrocarbon resources remains a key task for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and China must take this into account³³.

The multi-vector pipeline approach adopted by Ashgabat and Astana strengthens their negotiation positions, allowing them to choose the directions for the export of oil and gas. Turkmenistan is paying significant attention to the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI), which is planned to run from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. Its implementation would offer economic advantages and bolster Ashgabat's geopolitical positions. Simultaneously, Turkmenistan is implementing the construction of the East-West Gas Pipeline, which will unify all major gas fields in Turkmenistan into a single system.

Given the limited hydrocarbon potential of Central Asian countries, new pipeline projects may intensify competition for the oil and gas extracted from Central Asian deposits. In this context, the geopolitical plans of the United States and the European Union, which call on Ashgabat and Astana to participate in European projects for hydrocarbon exports, could clash with China's interests. This could potentially lead to increased rivalry between Beijing and European countries³⁴.

The situation in Central Asia could also be influenced by Iran, which has recently expressed interest in hydrocarbon extraction from the Caspian Sea with the intention of exporting them. This includes the prospective but unconfirmed Saradar Jangal oil and gas deposit, estimated to hold 1.4 trillion cubic meters of gas and 2 billion barrels of oil. Simultaneously, Tehran is exploring options to expand cooperation with Central Asian countries in exporting their hydrocarbon resources.

³² Гуан Пан. Энергетична політика Китаю та забезпечення безпеки в Центральній Азії... С. 105–106.

³³ Волков В. Китай-Туркменія: ставка більше, ніж газ...

³⁴ Ibidem.

The diversification of oil and gas export routes from the region is facilitated by China's policy, which links regional interests with the prospects of its own economic development. This factor is one of the key drivers in shaping the priorities of energy policy not only for the countries of Central Asia as sellers but also for China as a potentially major buyer of Central Asian oil and gas.

Conclusions. In summary, it can be claimed that the interest of the People's Republic of China in the oil and gas sectors of Central Asian countries became clear around the mid-1990s when Beijing turned its attention to Kazakhstan and began exploring the possibilities of transporting Kazakh oil to China. Since that time, the importance of the region in Chinese energy and economic policy has gradually increased, driven by both political and economic interests. Moreover, while in the late 1990s the project activity of China and Chinese companies in the oil and gas sector of Central Asian countries focused primarily on Kazakhstan, in the early 21st century, China's interest has gradually expanded to include other countries in the region. Currently, China's primary focus lies in the oil and gas sectors of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. China's presence in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan's oil and gas sectors is associated not so much with China's energy needs as with the promotion of its other economic and political interests in these countries and the region as a whole.

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